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Notes
ONE CASE TO RULE THEM ALL: THE NINTH CIRCUIT IN
BAKERSFIELD APPLIES COLONY TO DENY THE IRS AN
EXTENDED STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN
OVERSTATEMENT OF BASIS CASES
Gandalf: There is some new devilry here, devised for our
welcome, no doubt?
Legolas: Ai! Ai! A Balrog! A Balrog is come!
Gandalf: A Balrog, now I understand! . . . Fly! This is a foe beyond
any of you.'
I. INTRODUCTION
In one episode of the Lord of the Rings trilogy, Frodo and his compan-
ions, while navigating the labyrinthine Mines of Moria, encountered the
invincible Balrog, an ancient and terrible demon released long ago by the
prideful actions of the mine's former occupants. 2
Attorneys for the IRS (the Service) and the Department ofJustice, in
the course of litigating the latest round of seemingly impenetrable tax
shelters dating back to the 1990s, have encountered an ancient Supreme
Court precedent just as threatening to their litigation efforts as the Balrog
was to the Fellowship of the Ring.3 Unlike hapless Frodo and his friends,
the Service, through its zealous and possibly excessive enforcement efforts
in the most recent tax shelter cases, is squarely responsible for releasing
this precedent back into the world.4
1. J.R.R. TOLKIEN, THE FELLOWSHIP OF THE RING 320-21 (Houghton Mifflin
1994) (1954) (describing Fellowship's escape from Mines of Moria). The Balrog
was an invincible beast made of flame that was released from the depths of the
earth when dwarfish miners grew too prideful of their skills and dug their mine too
deep. See id. at 309 ("The Dwarves tell no tale . . . they delved too greedily and too
deep, and disturbed that from which they fled.").
2. See id. at 321-22 ("His enemy halted again, facing him, and the shadow
about it reached out like two vast wings.").
3. See generally Joshua D. Blank, Overcoming Overdisclosure: Toward Tax Shelter
Detection, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1629, 1635 (2009) ("At first glance, tax shelters resem-
ble legitimate business deals that ought to receive the tax treatment claimed....
The close relationship between a real business deal and a tax shelter is what makes
the Service's task of detecting abusive tax planning so difficult.").
4. See Lee A. Sheppard, Scorched Earth in Son-of-BOSS Cases, 120 TAx NOTES 9,
10 (2008) (chronicling unusually overzealous efforts of Service in prosecuting tax-
payers and professionals associated with "Son of BOSS" tax shelter). The IRS, in a
2004 settlement offer, insisted on a penalty for abusers of the tax shelter before
litigating a single case, denied taxpayers who declined the settlement access to the
administrative appeals process, promulgated fighting regulations, and fought cases
until it began to lose them. See id. (describing rationale behind settlement offer).
(409)
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One tax shelter in particular, the "Son of BOSS," or (Son of) Bond
Option Sales Strategy, has spawned extensive litigation in recent years.5
The Son of BOSS tax shelter involves a complicated series of partnership-
level transactions designed to overstate partners' basis in partnership as-
sets, lower reportable gross income from the sale of those assets, and hide
the nature of such transactions from the Service.6 The Service discovered
A tax shelter is defined as any transaction or investment designed solely to produce
a loss on paper that lowers an individual's overall tax liability. See Susan Nelson,
Taxes Paid by High-Income Taxpayers and the Growth of Partnerships, STAT. INCOME
BULL., Fall 1985, at 55, 56-57 ("For some years, many partnerships have been uti-
lized as vehicles for tax shelters (defined . . . as activities producing net losses to
offset net income from other activities), and frequently . .. they have incurred no
real economic losses."). For more on the history of the Service's litigation of Son
of BOSS tax shelter abusers, see infra notes 6, 9, and accompanying text.
5. See Sheppard, supra note 4, at 10 (noting that, at time of Sheppard's article,166 Son of BOSS cases were docketed in Tax Court, 55 cases docketed in federal
district court, 33 cases docketed in Court of Federal Claims, and 460 cases re-
mained undocketed).
6. See Kligfield Holdings v. Comm'r, 128 T.C. 192, 194 (2007) (describing Son
of BOSS and related transactions). According to the United States Tax Court in
Kligfield, the common thread of all Son of BOSS transactions is a "transfer of assets
encumbered by" a liability to a partnership with the intent of "increasing basis in
that partnership." Id. The partnership can "treat the liabilities as uncertain" and
ignore them in computing basis because "liabilities are usually obligations to buy
securities, and typically are not fixed at the time of transfer." Id. As a result, "part-
ners will have a basis in the partnership" large enough to provide for huge paper
losses on their individual tax returns. See id. (discussing impact of Son of BOSS
transactions). Son of BOSS shelters might use offsetting currency options, pre-
mium loans, or short sales. See Sheppard, supra note 4, at 12 (noting variations of
Son of BOSS transactions).
Tax basis in property refers to the taxpayer's investment in that property and
is primarily used to compute the taxpayer's gain or loss from a property transfer.
See 26 U.S.C. § 1012(a) (2006) ("The basis of property shall be the cost of such
property. . . ."); BLACK's LAW DICrIONARY 161 (8th ed. 2004) (referring to value of
taxpayer's investment in property). The "amount realized" in a property disposi-
tion is the amount of money received and the fair market value of property re-
ceived on the disposition. See 28 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (defining "amount realized").
Taxable gain from a property is calculated as the difference between the amount
realized and the adjusted basis of the property; a higher adjusted basis leads to less
taxable gain on a transaction. See id. (noting that loss is calculated as excess of
adjusted basis over amount realized). Each partner's basis in the partnership inter-
est is "outside basis." See Kornman & Assocs. v. United States, 527 F.3d 443, 456
n.12 (5th Cir. 2008) (noting that partners and partnerships do not recognize gain
or loss from contributions of property to partnership, rather, partners receive part-
nership interest with outside basis equal to value of contribution). The partner-
ship entity also calculates its investment in partnership items to determine its
"inside basis." See Clearmeadow Invs., LLC v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 509, 519(2009) ("Under these provisions, this court is authorized to determine all the part-
nership items that enter into the calculation of Clearmeadow's basis in its assets-a
concept referred to as the 'inside basis' of the partnership.").
A short sale involves selling securities that the seller does not own. See Provost
v. United States, 269 U.S. 443, 450-51 (1926) (describing typical circumstances of
short sale under rules of New York Stock Exchange). In a typical short sale, an
investor borrows shares of a security from a broker at a stipulated fee or interest
rate; the investor then sells the shares to a buyer for the broker's purchase price.
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these tax shelter transactions and in 2000 issued Notice 2000-44, effectively
invalidating future Son of BOSS-type investments.7 In accordance with
See Zlotnick v. Tie Commc'ns, 836 F.2d 818, 820 (3d Cir. 1988) (describing typical
short sale of stocks). The investor, however, remains obligated to buy an
equivalent number of shares on the market and return the shares to the broker.
See id. (noting that short sale investors expect price per share of their investment to
decline). If the stock prices fall, the investor need not use the entire payment
received from the buyer to make the covering purchase, and therefore the investor
can make a profit on the transaction. See id. (cautioning that short sale investors
face unlimited risk of rise in stock prices).
Under the statutory framework of the Internal Revenue Code, a partner's ad-
justed basis in the partnership is the partner's contribution to the partnership. See
26 U.S.C. § 752(a) ("Any increase in a partner's share of liabilities of a partnership
... shall be considered as a contribution of money by such partner to the partner-
ship."). Similarly, when a partnership assumes a partner's individual liabilities, the
partner must decrease basis in the partnership. See id. § 752(b) ("Any decrease in
a partner's share of the liabilities of a partnership . . . shall be considered as a
distribution of money to the partner by the partnership."). Under the old rule,
obligations created by selling an option (referred to as "contingent obligations")
could not constitute liabilities under Section 752 because no actual obligation ex-
isted on the partnership's part until and unless the option was exercised. See Hel-
mer v. Comm'r, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 727, 731 (1975) (sustaining Government's
argument that contingent liabilities could not allow partner to increase individual
basis in partnership and therefore partner owed additional taxes when partnership
made distribution). As late as 2000, the Service continued to assert the Helmer rule
in cases of partner taxation. See Sala v. United States, 552 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1197
(D. Colo. 2008) (citing Salina P'ship v. Comm'r, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 686 (2000))
(requiring partner to increase basis where partnership received cash proceeds on
sale of borrowed Treasury bills but partnership's gain or loss from transaction de-
pended on cost of partnership to replace borrowed Treasury bills, and contrasting
such cash proceeds with option payments in Helmer that represented fixed pay-
ments on sale of partnership asset and that did not depend on claim for repay-
ment or demand for further services). For a further discussion of the impact of
the Helmer rule in Son of BOSS litigation, see infra notes 142-64 and accompanying
text.
Son of BOSS shelters came about because both the Service and taxpayers op-
erated for decades without a working, comprehensive definition of a partnership
liability. See Sheppard, supra note 4, at 13 ("During the years these shelters were
being done, the partnership law had not yet adequately addressed . . . whether
contingent obligations such as loan premiums, short sales, or options are 'liabili-
ties' under [S] ection 752."). In the variant of a Son of BOSS transaction at issue in
this Note, partners would create a new partnership into which they would transfer
their interests in the old partnership. See Jeremiah Coder, IRS Facing Unreceptive
Courts in Overstated Basis Cases, 124 TAx NoTEs 758, 758-59 (2009) (describing Son
of BOSS cases involving abuse of partnership rules). Under Section 708(b), the
old partnership technically terminates if more than half of its partnership interests
changes hands. See id. (describing statutory framework for Son of BOSS transac-
tion similar to that at issue in this Note). Under Section 754, the old partnership
can elect to adjust its basis in its assets to account for the sales price of its interests
to new partners under Section 743(b). See id. (explaining how partnerships ac-
quire enhanced basis). For an example of this type of transaction and the statu-
tory framework that allowed it, see infra notes 64-71 and accompanying text.
7. See I.R.S. Notice 2000-44, 2000-2 C.B. 255 (disallowing artificial losses lack-
ing economic substance as deductions for federal income tax purposes and specifi-
cally warning of penalties for engaging in use, promotion, or reporting of Son of
BOSS basis overstatement transactions).
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this Notice, courts have largely sided with the Service in cases where the
validity of the underlying Son of BOSS tax shelter transactions was at issue,
concluding that the transactions lacked economic substance and were
therefore invalid.8 Although the Service offered a settlement initiative in
2004 to more than 1200 qualifying taxpayers, roughly 750 taxpayers-
many with large amounts of money at stake-chose not to participate or
did not qualify.9
Catching Son of BOSS tax abusers in time to assess tax liability has
become an issue of principal importance to the the Service. 0 Though the
judiciary is mostly favorable to the Service's goal, quick detection remains
a crucial goal for the Service because the tax abusers are using shelters
that are complex, multilayered, and continuously evolving." Tax shelters
typically involve the use of several pass-through entities, including partner-
ships and trusts; while the pass-through entity itself is not taxable, it serves
as a conduit through which its income, losses, and deductions pass to its
owners.12 If the Service cannot catch the tax abuse before the statute of
8. See, e.g., Jade Trading, LLC v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 11, 45-6 (2007)(finding partner taxpayers' adjusted basis artificially high where partners bought
and sold Euro options through partnership for net premium of $150,000, trans-
ferred spread to partnership, claimed basis of nearly $15 million in partnership
interests, and generated $14.9 million tax loss), reh'g denied, 81 Fed. Cl. 173 (2008);
see also Cemco Investors v. United States, 515 F.3d 749, 751 (7th Cir. 2008) ("A
transaction with an out-of-pocket cost of $6,000 and no risk beyond that expense,
while generating a tax loss of $3.6 million, is the sort of thing the Internal Revenue
Service frowns upon."), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 131 (2008); Kornman & Assocs., 527
F.3d at 456 ("The Trust ... only suffered a $200,000 economic loss . . . yet it
claimed a $102.6 [m]illion tax loss .... The Appellants' premeditated attempt to
transform this wash transaction (for economic purposes) into a windfall (for tax
purposes) is reminiscent of an alchemist's attempt to transmute lead into gold.").
But see Sala, 552 F. Supp. 2d at 1175-76, 1186 (finding that series of transactions
after taxpayer's investment of $9 million, which resulted in tax loss of nearly $60.3
million, did not lack economic substance); Sheppard, supra note 4, at 13 (arguing
that most Son of BOSS cases now litigate fighting regulation issue, rather than
validity of underlying transactions).
9. See Press Release, U.S. Treasury Dep't, Robust Response for Executive
Stock Option Initiative; Son of BOSS Settlement Heading for $4 Billion (July 11,2005), available at http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/o,,id=141014,00.html
("About 750 taxpayers did not elect or did not qualify to participate in the Son of
Boss settlement offer. The Service will continue to pursue these cases through
audits and the normal litigation process.").
10. See Hale E. Sheppard, Only Time Will Tell: The Growing Importance of theStatute of Limitations in an Era of Sophisticated International Tax Structuring, 30 BROOK.J. INT'L L. 453, 462 (2005) (arguing that, when taxpayers utilize tax shelters, Ser-
vice faces serious problems in assessing taxes on time).
11. See id. at 461-62 (explaining difficulties that Service faces when attempting
to catch tax abusers in time to assess tax). For a discussion of court holdings re-garding Son of BOSS cases, including victories and defeats for the Service in its
enforcement efforts, see infra notes 142-64 and accompanying text.
12. See Sheppard, supra note 10, at 454 (citing Publication 4310: Abusive Tax
Schemes, TAx FRAUD ALERT (IRS, Wash., D.C.), Apr. 2004, at 1) (noting that pass-
through entities allow taxpayers to conceal true recipients of income and losses).
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limitations runs, the taxpayer may experience a "total and complete vic-
tory" in any litigation, regardless of the merits of the the Service's claim.1 3
The Service typically has three years after the date a tax return is filed
to assess a tax or send a notice of deficiency to the taxpayer.14 However,
the Service may invoke a statute of limitations of up to six years when a
taxpayer: (1) omits an amount of gross income greater than twenty-five
percent of the gross income reported on the form, and (2) fails to disclose
the amount in a manner adequate to inform the Service of the nature and
amount of the omitted item.' 5 In 2006, the Service began to assert the
extended statute of limitations under Internal Revenue Code Section
6501(e) (1) (A) against abusers of the Son of BOSS tax shelter.1 6
The Service's assertion of the extended statute of limitations raises
the issue of whether an overstatement of basis can constitute an omission
from gross income, and this issue has brought a fifty-year-old Supreme
Court case to the forefront.' 7 Since 1958, the decision in Colony, Inc. v.
Commissioner's is the sole Supreme Court case to squarely address the issue
of whether overstatements of basis constitute omissions from gross income
13. See id. at 463 (citing EFFECTIVELY REPRESENTING YOUR CLIENT BEFORE THE
"NEW" IRS 1240 (Jerome Borrison ed., 3d ed. 2004)) (stressing importance of Sec-
tion 6501's statute of limitations in every tax case, and noting that it may be raised
at any point before decision on merits).
14. See 26 U.S.C. § 6501 (a) (2006) (providing that statute of limitations tolls
regardless of whether taxpayer filed return on or after prescribed filing date). Sec-
tion 6501 also provides the applicable statute of limitations for the assessment of
partnership items unless 26 U.S.C. § 6229(a) extends the period. See AD Global
Fund, LLC ex rel. N. Hills Holding, Inc. v. United States, 481 F.3d 1351, 1352, 1354
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (finding no exception in Section 6501 for partnership items and
applying Section 6501 to determine statute of limitations for final partnership ad-
ministrative adjustment (FPAA)).
15. See 26 U.S.C. § 6501(e) (1) (A) (setting out extended statute of limitations
for returns with substantial omissions from gross income); id. § 6501(e) (1) (A) (ii)
(excluding amounts as "omissions" for Section 6501(e) (1) (A) purposes where tax-
payer adequately discloses nature and amount on or attached to return). The
United States Tax Court interpreted Section 6501(e) (1) (A) (ii) to require that the
taxpayer furnish the Service with a "clue" more than "sufficient to intrigue a Sher-
lock Holmes," but less than a "detailed revelation of each and every underlying
fact." Quick Trust v. Comm'r, 54 T.C. 1336, 1346-47 (1970) (finding that, because
partnership return reported withdrawals by and distributions to estate far in excess
of distributions of ordinary income to estate, Service had clear notice that estate
received amounts from partnership far in excess of amount reported on estate's
return).
16. See Sheryl Stratton, With Six-Year Statute, IRS Pulls Out All Assessment Stops for
Shelters, 111 TAx NoTEs 536, 536 (2006) (noting that Service sent many practition-
ers representing Son of BOSS investors deficiency notices, FPAA notices, and no-
tices of beginning of administrative proceedings, all relying on extended six-year
statute of limitations).
17. See Coder, supra note 6, at 758 ("Two appellate courts in the past three
months have both held that the IRS is limited to three years in issuing a deficiency
. ... The courts have primarily relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Colony,
Inc. v. Commissioner. . . .") (citation omitted).
18. 357 U.S. 28 (1958).
2010] NorE 413
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under the Internal Revenue Code.1 9 The Court in Colony held that an
overstatement of basis leading to an understatement of gross income does
not constitute an omission from gross income for the purposes of Section
6501(e) (1) (A) of the Internal Revenue Code.20 The Court construed a
provision under the 1939 Code that Congress carried over to the 1954
Code with substantially identical language.2 1 Because the Court's holding
in Colony precludes the extended statute of limitations, subsequent cases
have distinguished the Supreme Court's holding in light of the 1954 Code
changes by either limiting Colony to taxpayers in a trade or business, or
finding that the taxpayer did not adequately disclose certain transactions
on the return. 22
19. See Coder, supra note 6, at 758 ("The courts have primarily relied on the
Supreme Court's decision in Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, interpreting the tax code
to allow extended assessment periods only for situations involving income items
wholly missing from the return, rather than simply misreported.") (internal cita-
tion omitted).
20. See Colony, 357 U.S. at 36 ("[T]o impose a five-year limitation when such
errors affect 'gross income,' but a three-year limitation when they do not, not only
would be to read § 275(c) more broadly than is justified . .
21. For a discussion of the similarities between the extended statute of limita-
tions provisions of the 1939 and 1954 Internal Revenue Codes, see infra note 52
and accompanying text.
22. See Coder, supra note 6, at 761 ("Most courts have felt constrained to fol-
low Colony even if they alluded to a belief that it may have been wrongly decided
fifty years ago."). For cases limiting Colony to taxpayers in a trade or business, see,
for example, N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Comm'r, 101 T.C. 294, 300 n.7 (1993) ("For
non-business items and those not covered under [S] ec. 6501(e) (1) (A) (i), the gen-
eral definition of gross income found in the Code applies."); Insulglass Corp. v.
Comm'r, 84 T.C. 203, 210 (1985) ("In the case of a trade or business, 'gross in-
come' is equated with gross receipts. Otherwise, 'gross income' means those items
listed in [S]ection 61(a), which includes, among other things, gains derived from
dealings in property."); Benson v. Comm'r, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) 925, 926 (2006)
("This Court has found that the [S]ection 61 definition of gross income generally
applies to [S]ection 6501 (e) (1) (A)."); Schneider v. Comm'r, T.C.M. (CCH) 1032,
1035 (1985) ("Thus, it is only for the purpose of calculating trade or business gross
income under Section 6501(e) that the 'gross receipts' method is utilized in deter-
mining gross income."); Carr v. Comm'r, T.C.M. (CCH) 1695, 1703 (1978) ("For
purposes of [S]ection 6501 (e) (1) (A), gross income includes those items listed in
[S]ection 61(a), except that [S]ection 6501(e)(1)(A)(i) provides that gross re-
ceipts from a trade or business are to be taken into account in lieu of gross income
therefrom."). For cases distinguishing Colony on the ground that the taxpayer in
the instant case did not adequately disclose certain transactions on the return, see,
for example, Salman Ranch Ltd. v. United States, 573 F.3d 1362, 1382 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (Newman, J., dissenting) ("To summarize precedent, courts have generally
applied the rationale of Colony . .. where taxpayers made errors in basis that were
reasonably identifiable from the information in their tax returns."); Taylor v.
United States, 417 F.2d 991, 993 (5th Cir. 1969) ("[T] he statute provides that an
item of income is 'omitted' if the item is not shown in a manner sufficient to
enable the Government, upon a reasonable inspection, to detect the error. ...
[T]he Government is not to be penalized by a taxpayer's failure to reveal the
facts."); Phinney v. Chambers, 392 F.2d 680, 685 (5th Cir. 1968) ("[T]he enact-
ment of subsection (ii) . . . makes it apparent that the six year statute is intended to
apply where there is . . . [a] misstating of the nature of an item of income which
places the 'commissioner . . . at a special disadvantage in detecting errors.'");
414 [Vol. 55: p. 409
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Recently, however, courts have begun to apply Colony to all taxpayers
generally, and accordingly refused to allow the extended limitations pe-
riod in all cases where a taxpayer's overstatement of basis led to an under-
statement of gross income.2 3 In 2009, following judicial setbacks in
overstatement of basis cases such as Bakersfield Energy Partners, LP v. Com-
missione 4 and Salman Ranch Ltd. v. United States,2 5 the Service issued Trea-
sury Decision 9466, a set of temporary regulations that limit Colony to cases
involving a trade or a business.2 6
This Note discusses the evolution of lower courts' interpretations of
the extended statute of limitations since Colony and concludes that Bakers-
field, in which the Ninth Circuit held that a taxpayer's overstatement of
basis in sold assets does not constitute an omission from gross income
under Section 6501(e) (1) (A), correctly identified Colony as controlling
precedent.2 7 Additionally, this Note argues that, although the Bakersfield
court correctly identified Colony as controlling judicial precedent, the Col-
ony rule no longer adequately advances the policy concerns discussed in
the Supreme Court's 1958 opinion in light of modern tax shelter schemes
such as Son of BOSS.2 8 Part II summarizes the jurisprudence-before,
after, and including the Colony decision-surrounding the Service's asser-
tion of an extended statute of limitations in overstatements of basis
cases.29 Part III focuses upon the Ninth Circuit's recent decision in Bakers-
field that, under Colony, overstatement of basis does not constitute omis-
sion of gross income for the purpose of asserting the extended statute of
Brandon Ridge Partners v. United States, No. 8:06-cv-1340-T-24MAP, 2007 WL
2209129, at *7 (M.D. Fla. July 30, 2007) ("Furthermore, there are Fifth Circuit
cases that are binding on this Court that state that an item of income is omitted if
the item is not shown in a manner sufficient to enable the IRS, upon reasonable
inspection, to detect the error.").
23. See Grapevine Imps., Ltd. v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 505, 509-10 (2007)
(noting Tax Court's changing interpretation of Colony rationale from limitation to
trade or business exception to more general application to all of Section
6501(e) (1) (A)); Bakersfield Energy Partners v. Comm'r, 128 T.C. 207, 215 (2007)
("We do not believe that either than language or the rationale of Colony, Inc. can
be limited to the sale of goods or services by a trade or business."), aff'd, 568 F.3d
767 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Salman Ranch, 573 F.3d at 1373 ("[T]he Court did not
say that its holding was limited to sales of goods or services by a trade or
business.").
24. 128 T.C. 207, 215 (2007), aff'd, 568 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 2009).
25. 573 F.3d 1362, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
26. See 26 C.F.R. § 301 (2009) ("Accordingly, outside the context of a trade or
business, any basis overstatement that leads to an understatement of gross income
under Section 61(a) constitutes an omission of gross income for purposes of
[S]ections 6501 (e) (1) (A) and 6229(c) (2).").
27. For a discussion of the holding in Bakersfield, see infra notes 77-96 and
accompanying text.
28. For a discussion of the recent failures of the Colony rule in light of modern
tax shelters and the need to revisit the rule, see infra notes 97-107 and accompany-
ing text.
29. For a discussion of the development ofjurisprudence concerning the ex-
tended statute of limitations, see infra notes 33-61 and accompanying text.
4152010] NorE
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limitations under Section 6501(e) (1) (A). 3 0 Part IV analyzes whether, in
light of decisions such as Bakersfield, the Supreme Court will overrule Col-
ony, or lower courts will accord deference to Treasury Decision 9466 and
limit Colony to only those cases involving a trade or a business.3 ' Part V
concludes with a discussion of the impact of Bakersfield and Treasury Deci-
sion 9466.32
II. THERE AND BACK AGAIN: CONTROVERSY OVER BASIS CASES LEADS TO
CoLoN, CoLoNY LEADS TO CONTROVERSY OVER BASIS CASES
The extended statute of limitations for omissions from gross income
has existed since the Revenue Act of 1934 was codified in the 1939 Inter-
nal Revenue Code under Section 275(c) and exists today as Section
6501(e) (1) (A). 3 3 From the outset, courts disagreed over whether an over-
statement of cost items such as basis could constitute an "omission" from
gross income that would trigger the extended statute of limitations.3 4 The
Supreme Court held in Colony that an overstatement of basis in a sold asset
that leads to an understatement of gross income did not constitute an
omission from gross income for the purposes of the extended statute of
limitations.3 5 Despite the Supreme Court's holding in Colony, numerous
lower courts have reached contrary results in subsequent cases.3 6
A. Before Colony
From its inception, Section 275(c) of the Revenue Act of 1934 led to
controversy regarding the meaning of the phrase "omits from gross in-
come."37 As originally enacted, the statute provided an extended statute
of limitations for tax assessment when the taxpayer non-fraudulently omits
30. For a discussion of the facts and procedure of Bakersfield, see infra notes
64-76 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's holding and
rationale, see infra notes 77-96 and accompanying text.
31. For an analysis of the future of overstatement of basis cases after Bakers-field, see infra notes 97-168 and accompanying text. .
32. For a discussion of the impact of Treasury Decision 9466, see infra notes
169-72 and accompanying text.
33. See Colony, Inc. v. Comm'r, 357 U.S. 28, 34 (1958) (addressing legislative
history of extended statute of limitations under Section 275(c)).
34. For a discussion of the circuit split leading to the Colony decision, see infra
notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
35. See Colony, 357 U.S. at 36 ("[T]o impose a five-year limitation when such
errors affect 'gross income,' but a three-year limitation when they do not, not only
would be to read § 275(c) more broadly than is justified . . ."
36. See, e.g., id. at 31 ("We granted certiorari because this decision conflicted
with rulings in other Courts of Appeals on the same issue . . . ."); Home Concrete
& Supply, LLC v. United States, 599 F. Supp. 2d 678, 684 (E.D.N.C. 2008) ("In the
years since Colony was decided, a handful of courts have applied its holding regard-
ing overstatement of basis to § 6501 (e) (1)(A), with unharmonious results.").
37. See Colony, 357 U.S. at 29, 33 (explaining developing circuit split over stat-
ute's construction and outlining legislative history of statute).
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more than twenty-five percent of gross income on a tax return.3 8 Six cir-
cuit courts of appeals held that an overstatement of cost items, including
basis, did not constitute an omission from gross income under Section
275(c) when the overstatement led to an understatement of gross in-
come.3 9 Standing in opposition, the United States Tax Court and the
Sixth Circuit both held that, in some circumstances, understatements of
gross income resulting from erroneous inclusion or overstatement of cost
items could constitute an omission for the purposes of Section 275(c). 4 0
Specifically, these courts reasoned that an overstatement of basis in sold
property, an improper listing of labor and supply items as a cost of goods
sold, and improper inclusions that inflated the cost of a sold lease would
38. See Badaracco v. Comm'r, 464 U.S. 386, 392 (1984) (instructing that both
standard three-year and extended six-year statutes of limitations do not apply in
cases of false or fraudulent returns with intent to evade tax).
39. See, e.g., Goodenow v. Comm'r, 238 F.2d 20, 22 (8th Cir. 1956) (determin-
ing that overstatement of deductions for cost basis of assets sold, resulting in insuf-
ficient gross income on return, did not constitute "omission from gross income"
for purposes of Section 275(c) extended statute of limitations), rev' 25 T.C. 1
(1955); Davis v. Hightower, 230 F.2d 549, 553 (5th Cir. 1956) ("It cannot be
thought that if a taxpayer. . . arrives at an incorrect computation of the tax only by
reason of a difference between him and the Commissioner as to the legal construc-
tion ... [of] a disclosed transaction, the use of a smaller figure than that ultimately
found to be correct in one stage of the computation amounts to an omission from
'gross income' ... ."); Slaff v. Comm'r, 220 F.2d 65, 68 (9th Cir. 1955) (finding no
omission from gross income for Section 275(c) purposes where taxpayer's return
disclosed $3,300 of overseas earnings, claimed earnings were exempt, and re-
ported no gross income); Deakman-Wells Co. v. Comm'r, 213 F.2d 894 (3d Cir.
1954) (finding no omission of gross income for Section 275(c) purposes where
taxpayer erroneously calculated carryback loss and understated gross income by
roughly fifty percent and where taxpayer disclosed all income items on schedule
attached to return but erroneously excluded some in final computation);
Uptegrove Lumber Co. v. Comm'r, 204 F.2d 570, 572 (3d Cir. 1953) (finding no
omission of gross income for Section 275(c) purposes where taxpayer included
erroneous items in cost of goods sold calculation, resulting in understatement of
final gross income calculation, and taxpayer revealed erroneous items on return);
Lazarus v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 897, 898 (Fed. Cl. 1956) ("The plaintiffs
could not have made any plainer disclosure of their gains of $23,988.02 than they
did make, without putting them directly in the income column and paying taxes
on them.").
40. See, e.g., Reis v. Comm'r, 142 F.2d 900, 903-04 (6th Cir. 1944) (upholding
extended statute of limitations under Section 275(c) where taxpayer adopted in-
correct basis amount in property, sold it, and understated gross income by more
than twenty-five percent); Estate of Gibbs v. Comm'r, 21 T.C. 443, 447-48 (1954)
(applying extended statute of limitations under Section 275(c) where taxpayer im-
properly listed labor and supply items as costs of goods sold, accordingly under-
stated gross income by more than twenty-five percent, and introduced no evidence
to prove what erroneous labor and supply items actually were); Am. Liberty Oil Co.
v. Comm'r, 1 T.C. 386, 388-89 (1942) (upholding extended statute of limitations
under Section 275(c) where taxpayer included improper items in cost of lease it
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constitute an omission from gross income such that the extended statute
of limitations would apply.4 1
B. Colony
To resolve the circuit split, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to determine what constitutes an "omission from gross income"
for the purposes of the extended statute of limitations.4 2 In Colony, a cor-
poration conducting real estate transactions allegedly filed a tax return
containing understatements of gross income of more than twenty-five per-
cent because of an overstatement of basis in land it sold.4 3 The Court in
Colony purported to provide definitive guidance on whether an overstate-
ment of basis could constitute an omission from gross income under Sec-
tion 275(c) of the 1939 Internal Revenue Code.4 4
Initially, the Court analyzed the language of Section 275(c) and deter-
mined that an omission from gross income should likely be limited to situ-
ations outside of overstatement of basis, in which "specific receipts or
accruals of income items are left out of the computation of gross in-
come."45 The Court concluded that Section 275(c) was ambiguous, and
turning to the legislative history, found that Congress did not intend an
overstatement of basis to be an omission from gross income.4 6 The Court
41. For a discussion of pre-Colony cases and their specific factual situations,
see supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
42. See Colony, 357 U.S. at 31-32 ("We granted certiorari because this decision
conflicted with rulings in other Courts of Appeals on the same issue .... ).
43. See Colony, Inc. v. Comm'r, 244 F.2d 75, 76 (6th Cir. 1957) (detailing case
facts), rev'd, 357 U.S. 28. The Commissioner determined that the taxpayer under-
stated gross profits on the sale of residential lots of land by erroneously including
some unallowable items of development expense into its basis calculation. See Col-
ony, 357 U.S. at 30 (outlining facts and procedure of case).
44. See id. at 31 (stating issue for decision).
45. See id. at 33 (agreeing with taxpayer's plain language argument). The tax-
payer argued that statutory words should be used according to their usual mean-
ing. See id. at 32 ("[S] tatutory words are presumed to be used in their ordinary and
usual sense, and with the meaning commonly attributable to them." (quoting
DeGanay v. Lederer, 250 U.S. 376, 381 (1919))). Further, the Court noted that
the dictionary definition of "omit" means "to leave out" or not mention. See id.
(" [T]o leave out or unmentioned; not to insert, include, or name" (quoting WEB-
STER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DicroNARY (2nd ed. 1939))). The Sixth Circuit had
similarly defined "omit" in a case upholding the use of the six-year statute of limita-
tions under Section 275(c). See Ewald v. Comm'r, 141 F.2d 750, 753 (6th Cir.
1944) ("Ordinarily, the word 'omit' means to disregard, to fail, forbear, neglect to
mention, or fail to insert or include.").
46. See Colony, 357 U.S. at 34 (chronicling legislative history of Section 276).
The Court found that House Subcommittee debates emphasized that the taxpayer
must leave out entire items from gross income, rather than overstate them. See id.
("What we really had in mind wasjust this kind of situation: Assume that a taxpayer
left out, say, a million dollars; he just forgot it. We felt that whenever we found
that he did that we ought to get the . .. tax on it." (quoting Hearings Before the H.
Comm. on Ways and Means, 73d Cong. 139, 149 (1934))). The full Committee ap-
peared to take the same attitude to omissions. See id. ("It is not believed that tax-
payers who are so negligent as to leave out of their returns items of such
418 [Vol. 55: p. 409
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noted that the underlying reason for the statute of limitations extension
was to level the playing field between the Service and the taxpayer in cases
where the Service is at a distinct disadvantage because the taxpayer omits
information from the tax return and the return offers no clues that an
omission has occurred.4 7 Additionally, the Court rejected the Service's
argument that where there is an error on the face of the return such that
the Service is not at a disadvantage, the Service should be permitted the
statute of limitations extension if the error "affect[ed] gross income."48
While the Court expressly declined to construe amendments to the ex-
tended statute of limitations under the 1954 Code, it remarked that its
construction of the predecessor statute, Section 275(c) under the 1939
Code, was consistent with the unambiguous language of its successor stat-
ute, Section 6501(e) (1) (A) under the 1959 Code.4 9
magnitude should be accorded the privilege of pleading the bar of the statute."
(quoting H.R. REP. No. 73-704, at 35 (1934))). The Court then noted that Section
275(c) did not change the basic objectives underlying the enactment of Section
276 of the Revenue Act of 1934. See id. (applying Section 276 legislative history to
Section 275(c)). But see Grapevine Imps., Ltd. v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 505,
510 n.5 (2007) ("Among other things, the Court in Colony seemingly downplayed
the portions of the legislative history that suggested that the statute applies simply
where a taxpayer 'understates gross income."'); Robert J. Richards, Jr., The Ex-
tended Statute of Limitations on Assessment, 12 TAx L. REv. 297, 311 (1957) ("When
the words of the statute are read in light of the Committee Reports taken as a
whole, it is difficult to understand why such a limited meaning is placed on
'omits."'). The Court of Federal Claims in Grapevine admitted that the legislative
history included examples of situations in which the extended statute should ap-
ply, such as when a taxpayer completely left out a dividend from the return, but
found the legislative history unclear as to when the extended statute should not
apply. See Grapevine, 77 Fed. Cl. at 510 n.5 (quoting S. REP. No. 73-558, at 44
(1934)) (questioning Colony's employment of legislative history in constructing
Section 275(c)). But see Pension Benefits Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633,
649 (1990) ("[T]he language of a statute ... is not to be regarded as modified by
examples set forth in the legislative history. An example, after all, is just that: an
illustration of a statute's operation in practice.").
47. See Colony, 357 U.S. at 36 ("We think that in enacting § 275(c) Congress
manifested no broader purpose than to give the Commissioner an additional two
years to investigate tax returns in cases where, because of a taxpayer's omission to
report some taxable item, the Commissioner is at a special disadvantage in de-
tecting errors.").
48. See id. at 36-37 ("To accept the Commissioner's interpretation and to im-
pose a five-year limitation when such errors affect 'gross income,' but a three-year
limitation when they do not, not only would be to read § 275(c) more broadly than
is justified by the evident reason for its enactment, but also to create a patent
incongruity in the tax law.").
49. See id. at 37 ("And without doing more than noting the speculative debate
between the parties as to whether Congress manifested an intention to clarify or to
change the 1939 Code, we observe that the conclusion we reach is in harmony with
the unambiguous language of § 6501(e) (1) (A) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954."). Courts have seized on this dictum in an effort to limit Colony's holding to
only certain portions of Section 6501 (e)(1)(A), the successor statute. For a discus-
sion ofjudicial narrowing of the Colony decision, see infra notes 55-59 and accom-
panying text.
11
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C. The Aftermath of Colony
Colony dealt with tax returns from tax years 1946 and 1947, which
means that the Court interpreted the extended statute of limitations provi-
sion, Section 275(c), under the 1939 Code.5 0 In 1954, Congress enacted a
new Internal Revenue Code that purportedly resolved the issue, addressed
in Colony, of whether an overstatement of basis constitutes an omission
from gross income for the purposes of the extended statute of limita-
tions.5 1 The 1954 version of Section 275(c), Section 6501 (e) (1) (A), en-
acted substantially identical text to Section 275(c) in subparagraph (A)
and added two rules in Clauses (i) and (ii). 5 2
50. See Colony, 357 U.S. at 31-32 ("We granted certiorari because ... the ques-
tion as to the proper scope of § 275(c), although resolved for the future by
§ 6501(e) (1) (A) . . . remains one of substantial importance in the administration
of income tax laws for earlier tax years.").
51. See id. at 31 (noting that questions as to proper scope of Section 275(c)
had been resolved by introduction of Section 6501(e) (1) (A) under 1954 Code).
The 1954 Code added two new provisions to the extended statute of limitations for
omissions from gross income that the Colony decision did not purport to construe.
See Salman Ranch Ltd. v. United States, 573 F.3d 1362, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ("The
[G]overnment contends that its limiting construction of Colony finds support in
changes made to the 1939 Code by the 1954 Code. . . . In making this argument,
the [G]overnment focuses first on subparagraphs (i) and (ii) of I.R.C.
6501(e) (1) (A), both of which were added . . . by the 1954 Code."). Clause (i)
specified that, in cases of sales of goods or services by a trade or business, gross
income should be computed as "gross receipts," without considering cost or basis
in transactions. See 26 U.S.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A)(i) (2006) ("[T]he term 'gross in-
come' means the total amounts received or accrued ... prior to diminution by the
cost of such sales or services."). Clause (ii), the "safe harbor" provision, stipulates
that if an amount is disclosed on the return in a manner adequate to inform the
IRS of the nature and amount of the item, it cannot be considered in any calcula-
tion of an omission from gross income. See id. § 6501(e) (1) (A) (ii) (detailing ade-
quate disclosure provision). For a discussion of the specific requirements of the
adequate disclosure provision of Clause (ii), see supra note 15 and accompanying
text.
52. See Home Concrete & Supply, LLC v. United States, 599 F. Supp. 2d 678,
684-85 (E.D.N.C. 2008) (discussing carryover of language from Section 275(c) to
Section 6501(e) (1) (A) and impact of Congress's addition of Clauses (i) and (ii));
see also Salman Ranch, 573 F.3d at 1373 ("Nevertheless, the fact remains that Colony
represents an interpretation of the very same language that is now found in
§ 6501(e) (1) (A), and in the years since Colony, Congress has not indicated that the
Court's interpretation of the language of § 275(c) should not apply to
§ 6501(e) (1) (A)."); Bakersfield Energy Partners, LP v. Comm'r, 568 F.3d 767, 776
(9th Cir. 2009) ("Congress was presumably aware of the dispute over the interpre-
tation of § 275(c), and it could have expressly added a definition of 'omits' if it
wanted to overrule the cases that concluded . . . that 'omits' did not include an
overstatement of basis."); Grapevine Imps., Ltd. v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 505,
510 (2007) (noting that 1939 and 1954 statutes carry same meaning because Con-
gress did not modify "omits" and Court in Colony determined its discussion of 1954
statute to be "in harmony" with its discussion of 1939 statute); NORMAN J. SINGER &
J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND'S STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUcTION
§ 22.33 (6th ed. 2002) (explaining that successor statutes constitute "a continua-
tion of the original law"); cf United States v. O'Brien, 542 F.3d 921, 926 (1st Cir.
2008) (finding that Congress's act of breaking long sentences of predecessor stat-
ute up into subdivisions in successor statute reflected only current trend toward
420 [ol. 55: p. 409
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Since the Colony decision and the enactment of the 1954 Code, courts
have struggled with whether the extended statute of limitations in Section
6501(e) (1) (A) under the 1954 Code applies only when the taxpayer omits
an item of gross income on the return, or whether it also applies in cases
where a taxpayer overstates basis in an asset and understates gross in-
come.5 3 Under principles of stare decisis, lower courts may not overrule
Colony.5 4 Nevertheless, after Colony, some courts have attempted to limit
the holding to situations involving the sale of goods or services by a trade
ease of reading and did not render precedent construing predecessor statute inap-
plicable; Strange v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 206, 210 n.4 (2000) (applying precedent
that determined taxpayer could not deduct from gross income state income tax
paid on share of net business income from certain partnerships where precedent
construed sections of 1939 Internal Revenue Code that were "substantially the
same" as provisions of 1954 Code); Lilly v. Comm'r, 45 T.C. 168, 175 (1965) (ap-
plying precedent that construed meaning of "life insurance" under 1939 Internal
Revenue Code to after-death payments governed by 1954 Code where predecessor
and successor provisions were "substantially the same"). Compare 26 U.S.C § 257(c)
(1939), repealed by American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357,
§ 101(b) (5) (A), 118 Stat. 1418, 1423 (2004)) ("If the taxpayer omits from gross
income an amount properly includable therein which is in excess of 25 per cen-
tum of the amount of gross income stated on the return, the tax may be increased
... at any time within 5 years after the return was filed . . . ."), with 26 U.S.C.
6501(e) (1) (A) (2006) ("If the taxpayer omits from gross income an amount prop-
erly includable therein which is in excess of 25 percent of the amount of gross
income stated in the return, the tax may be assessed ... at any time within 6 years
after the return was filed.").
53. See Grapevine Imps., 77 Fed. Cl. at 509 (noting that since 1954 Code
amendments, courts have begun to question relevance of Colony); see also Home
Concrete & Supply, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 685 ("The two subsections Congress added to
§ 275(c) in drafting § 6501(e) (1) (A), acknowledged by the Court in Colony, make
clear the limit of its holding.").
54. See Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 252-53 (1998) ("Our decisions
remain binding precedent until we see fit to reconsider them, regardless of
whether subsequent cases have raised doubts about their continuing vitality."), va-
cated, 537 U.S. 801 (2002); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) ("Stare
decisis reflects 'a policy judgment that in most matters it is more important that
the applicable rule of law be settled than it be settled right."' (quoting Burnet v.
Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)));
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) ("If a
precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on
reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should fol-
low the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of over-
ruling its own decisions."); Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340, 1353
(Fed. Cir. 2006) ("There can be no question that the Court of Federal Claims is
required to follow the precedent of the Supreme Court .... even if the ... deci-
sions of the Supreme Court have been eroded, the Court of Federal Claims would
still be required to follow them as binding precedent."); Stone Container Corp. v.
United States, 229 F.3d 1345, 1349-50 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("Once the [Supreme]
Court has spoken, it is the duty of other courts to respect that understanding of
the governing rule of law." (quoting Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298,
312 (1994))); cf Bakersfield, 568 F.3d at 778 (noting that "IRS may have the author-
ity to promulgate a reasonable reinterpretation of an ambiguous provision of the
tax code, even if its interpretation runs contrary to the Supreme Court" (citing
Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982-83
(2005))).
13
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or business.5 5 Until at least 1993, the Tax Court consistently limited Col-
ony in this way.5 6 The Fifth Circuit and other courts limit Colony in an-
other manner, applying Colony only to situations where the taxpayer made
errors on the return that the Commissioner could reasonably identify
from information disclosed on the taxpayer's returns.5 7 Under this inter-
pretation, Colony is limited to cases where the taxpayer understated gross
income but properly disclosed all relevant amounts and transactions on
the return.5 8 One explanation for such narrow application of Colony is
that, as an unintended consequence of strict adherence to Colony, tax shel-
ter promoters have relied on the 1958 decision to fend off the Service's
enforcement efforts.5 9
55. See, e.g., Brandon Ridge Partners v. United States, No. 8:06-cv-1340-T-
24MAP, 2007 WL 2209129, at *7 (M.D. Fla. July 30, 2007) ("The IRS argues that
Colony's gross receipts test only applies to situations described in§ 6501(e) (1) (A) (i), which applies to trade or business sales of goods or services.
To conclude otherwise would render § 6501(e) (1) (A) (i) superfluous.").
56. See, e.g., N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Comm'r, 101 T.C. 294, 300 n.7 (1993)
("For nonbusiness items and those not covered under [S]ec. 6501(e) (1) (A) (i), the
general definition of gross income found in the Code applies."); Insulglass Corp. v.
Comm'r, 84 T.C. 203, 210 (1985) ("In the case of a trade or business, 'gross in-
come' is equated with gross receipts. Otherwise, 'gross income' means those items
listed in [S]ection 61(a), which includes, among other things, gains derived from
dealings in property."); Benson v. Comm'r, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) 925, 926 (2006)
("This Court has found that the [S]ection 61 definition of gross income generally
applies to [Section] 6501(e) (1) (A)."); Schneider v. Comm'r, 49 T.C.M. (CCH)
1032, 1035 (1985) ("Thus, it is only for the purpose of calculating trade or business
gross income under Section 6501 (e) that the 'gross receipts' method is used in
determining gross income."); Carr v. Comm'r, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1695, 1703
(1978) ("For purposes of [S]ection 6501(e) (1) (A), gross income includes those
items listed in Section 61(a), except that [S]ection 6501(e) (1) (A) (i) provides that
gross receipts from a trade or business are to be taken into account in lieu of gross
income therefrom.").
57. See Salman Ranch, 573 F.3d at 1382 (Newman, J., dissenting) ("To summa-
rize precedent, courts have generally applied the rationale of Colony . . . where
taxpayers made errors in basis that were reasonably identifiable from the informa-
tion on their tax returns"); see also Taylor v. United States, 417 F.2d 991, 993 (5th
Cir. 1969) (" [T]he statute provides that an item of income is 'omitted' if the item
is not shown in a manner sufficient to enable the Government, upon a reasonable
inspection, to detect the error.... [T]he Government is not to be penalized by a
taxpayer's failure to reveal the facts."); Phinney v. Chambers, 392 F.2d 680, 685
(5th Cir. 1968) (" [T]he enactment of subsection (ii) ... makes it apparent that the
six year statute is intended to apply where there is . . . [a] misstating of the nature
of an item of income which places the 'commissioner . .. at a special disadvantage
in detecting errors.'"); Brandon Ridge Partners, 2007 WL 2209129, at *7 ("Further-
more, there are Fifth Circuit cases that are binding on this Court that state that an
item of income is omitted if the item is not shown in a manner sufficient to enable
the IRS, upon reasonable inspection, to detect the error.").
58. For a discussion of decisions that have limited Colony under the adequate
disclosure rule, see supra note 57 and accompanying text.
59. See Colony, Inc. v. Comm'r, 357 U.S. 28, 36 (1958) ("We think that in
enacting § 275(c), Congress manifested no broader purpose than to give the Com-
missioner an additional two years to investigate tax returns in cases where, because
of a taxpayer's omission to report some taxable item, the Commissioner is at a special
disadvantage in detecting errors.") (emphasis added). Tax shelters are designed to
422
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Recently, however, courts have applied Colony's construction of Sec-
tion 275(c) to the entirety of Section 6501(e)(1)(A) and to all taxpayers
generally.6 0 Because such broad application of Colony precludes applica-
tion of the extended statute of limitations, the trend toward broad applica-
tion of Colony has led to increasingly unfavorable results for the the Service
in its tax shelter litigation efforts.6 1
III. BAKERSFiELD: THE NINTH CIRCUIT REAFFIRMS CoLoNY
The Ninth Circuit entered the Colony controversy in Bakersfield Energy
Partners, LP v. Commissioner.62 In this case, the Ninth Circuit adopted the
Tax Court's trend of broadly applying the Colony rule to all taxpayers.63
place the IRS at a "special disadvantage," so that the taxpayer can erroneously file a
tax return without detection. See Sheppard, supra note 10, at 454 ("[I]nstead of
simply not reporting income .. . a taxpayer may create numerous entities and then
cause such entities to enter into a multiplicity of transactions with each other in
order to obfuscate the fact that the taxpayer is the true recipient of the income
and should be taxed as such."). Yet the Colony rule requires precisely this act of
"not reporting" an item of income to trigger the extended statute of limitations.
See Colony, 357 U.S. at 36 (" [B]ecause of a taxpayer's omission to report some taxa-
ble item . . . ."). Most importantly, the Colony rule comes into play on motions for
summary judgment; if the court finds no omission of gross income, the taxpayer
automatically wins because the statute bars the Government's claim. See Salman
Ranch, 573 F.3d at 1377 ("The three-year limitations period of § 6501(e) (1) (A)
controls, which means that the FPAA was untimely and therefore invalid."); Bakers-field, 568 F.3d at 778 ("We therefore agree with the Tax Court's conclusion that the
FPAA was untimely, and we AFFIRM the judgment of the Tax Court.").
60. See Grapevine Imps., Ltd. v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 505, 509-10 (2007)
(noting Tax Court's changing interpretation of Colony rationale from limitation to
trade or business exception to more general application to all of Section
6501(e) (1) (A)); see also Salman Ranch, 573 F.3d at 1373 ("[T] he Court did not say
that its holding was limited to sales of goods or services by a trade or business.");
Bakersfield Energy Partners, LP v. Comm'r, 128 T.C. 207, 215 (2007), affd, 568
F.3d 767 ("We do not believe that either the language or the rationale of Colony,
Inc. can be limited to the sale of goods or services by a trade or business.").
61. See Sheppard, supra note 10, at 464 ("The magnitude of this matter has
not escaped certain tax practitioners, who explain that the significance of the SOL
[statute of limitations] as an issue cannot be overemphasized. It may provide a
complete and total victory to the taxpayer if the IRS violates it.").
62. 568 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 2009).
63. See id. at 778 (interpreting Colony to hold that taxpayers do not omit
amounts properly includable from gross income by overstating their basis in assets
on returns); see also Sheppard, supra note 4, at 12 (arguing that IRS's actions in
combating Son of BOSS cases will increase number of taxpayers taking IRS to
court). Sheppard explains that this rise is caused specifically by the IRS's insis-
tence on massive penalties regardless of facts of individual cases, policy difficulties
in settling cases against taxpayers with good facts, and the denial of access to ap-
peals regardless of the Service's stated goals of encouraging compliance and stop-
ping proliferation of Son of BOSS shelters. See Sheppard, supra note 4, at 12
(analyzing potential for litigation increases).
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A. Facts and Procedural Background
In Bakersfield, the taxpayer, Bakersfield Energy Partners, LP (Bakers-
field), owned an interest in an oil and gas property, which Seneca, a third
party, offered to purchase for $24 million. 64 Four of the seven Bakersfield
partners-comprising a majority interest in Bakersfield-formed a new
entity, Bakersfield Resources, LLC (Resources)-taxable as a partner-
ship-and sold their interests in Bakersfield to Resources for $20 mil-
lion.6 5 Because the four partners sold more than half of the total
partnership interests in Bakersfield to Resources, the Bakersfield partner-
ship technically terminated for tax purposes, and a new Bakersfield part-
nership was formed in which Resources held a majority interest.6 6
Following the transfer of partnership interest, the new Bakersfield
partnership elected to increase its basis in partnership assets, including
the oil and gas property.6 7 Bakersfield adjusted its total basis in its assets
by the $20 million sale price of the partnership interests sold to Resources
and allocated $16.5 million of the new basis to the oil and gas property.6 8
Bakersfield then closed the sale of the oil and gas property to Seneca for
$24 million.6 9 On its partnership tax return for the tax year ending De-
cember 1998, Bakersfield reported a gain from the sale of roughly $7.5
million (the sale price of $24 million minus its basis of $16.5 million) and
attached a short statement to the return that explained its basis adjust-
ment. 70 Shortly before the six-year statute of limitations expired, the Ser-
vice claimed Bakersfield's basis adjustment was invalid because the
transactions in partnership interests lacked economic substance.7 1
64. See Bakersfield, 568 F.3d at 768-69 (stating facts of case).
65. See id. at 769 (stating facts of case).
66. See id. (stating facts of case); see also 26 U.S.C. § 708(b)(1)(B) (2006)(specifying technical termination of partnership when majority of partnership in-
terests are sold or transferred within twelve month period).
67. See Bakersfield, 568 F.3d at 770 (stating facts of case); see also 26 U.S.C.§ 754 (allowing election to adjust basis after transfer of partnership assets); id.§ 743 (outlining procedure for election of basis adjustment).
68. See Bakersfield, 568 F.3d at 770 (stating facts of case).
69. See id. (stating facts of case).
70. See id. (stating facts of case). The attachment noted:
As reflected within the capital accounts, the partnership books were re-
stated to reflect the value of assets as required in the regulations under
I.R.C. [26 U.S.C. §] 704. As reflected within this return, in the event of a
sale of these assets proper adjustments have been made to reflect the tax
basis and the proper taxable gain.
Id. at 769-70.
71. See id. at 770 (setting forth IRS's claims that Bakersfield's basis adjustment
lacked economic substance, had no business purpose or economic effect, and/or
was meant to evade taxes and should not be honored for tax purposes). The IRS
determined that Bakersfield's basis in the oil and gas property was zero and calcu-
lated the gain from the property sale to Seneca as $22 million. See id. (describing
IRS's determination of Bakersfield's tax deficiency). The IRS concluded that Ba-
kersfield had underpaid its taxes and imposed a forty percent penalty on the un-
derpayment. See id. (stating facts of case).
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Bakersfield petitioned the United States Tax Court for readjustment
of its deficiency, claiming the Service's adjustment was untimely under the
three-year statute of limitations to assess a tax deficiency. 72 The Service
argued that the adjustment was timely under the extended six-year statute
of limitations, which it argued applied because Bakersfield omitted a prop-
erly includable amount from gross income that exceeded twenty-five per-
cent of the gross income stated on the return.7 3 The Tax Court applied
Colony and determined that the three-year statute of limitations applied
because the taxpayer did not omit any items from its gross income calcula-
tion.74 Therefore, the Service's adjustment was untimely.7 5 The Service
appealed the Tax Court's decision and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, hold-
ing that the Supreme Court's decision in Colony foreclosed any argument
that a taxpayer could omit an amount from gross income by overstating its
basis and understating its gross income.7
B. The Ninth Circuit's Analysis
In Bakersfield, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court and held that
an overstatement of basis does not constitute an omission from gross in-
come for the purposes of the extended statute of limitations in Section
6501(e) (1) (A). 7 7 The court determined that Colony still controlled, the
plain language of Section 6501(e) (1) (A) in the 1954 Code did not contra-
dict Colony, the passage of Section 6501(e) (1) (A) (i) in 1954 did not mate-
rially alter the statutory language in the 1939 Code construed in Colony,
and Colony's holding is not limited to cases concerning a trade or
business.78
1. Colony Applies
In reviewing the Service's statute of limitations claim, the Ninth Cir-
cuit first discussed whether the Colony decision was controlling in the pre-
72. See id. (laying out Bakersfield's argument in Tax Court).
73. See id. at 770-71 (describing IRS's argument before Tax Court); see also 26
U.S.C. § 6501(e) (1) (A) (allowing six-year statute of limitations when "taxpayer
omits from gross income an amount properly includable therein which is in excess
of 25 twenty-five percent of gross income stated in the return."); id. § 6229(c) (2)
(applying Section 6501(e) (1) (A) extended statute of limitations to partnership
taxpayers who similarly omit twenty-five percent or more of properly includable
gross income).
74. See Bakersfield, 568 F.3d at 778 ("We therefore agree with the Tax Court's
conclusion that the FPAA was untimely. . . .").
75. See id. at 771 (summarizing Tax Court's holdings); Bakersfield Energy
Partners v. Comm'r, 128 T.C. 207, 215-16 (2007) (ruling in favor of Bakersfield in
motion for summary judgment).
76. See Bakersfield, 568 F.3d at 778 (stating holding of case).
77. See id. (presenting holding of case).
78. See id. (stating holding). For further discussion of each of these four
grounds for the holding that an overstatement of basis does not constitute an omis-
sion from gross income for purposes the extended statute of limitations, see infra
notes 79-96 and accompanying text.
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sent case.7 9 Initially, the court explored the predecessor 1939 Code
provision construed in Colony, and noted that because the predecessor
Code provision was so similar to the current 1954 Code provision at issue,
Colony must control.8 0 The court acknowledged the disputes concerning
whether the extended statute of limitations in the predecessor statute ap-
plied in overstatement of basis cases, but determined that Ninth Circuit
precedent, like a majority of circuits, holds that it does not.8 '
The court then shifted its focus to the 1954 Internal Revenue Code,
in which Congress reenacted Section 275(c) as Section 6501 (e) (1) (A).82
Importantly, the court noted the addition of Clause (i) to subparagraph
6501 (e) (1) (A), which defines gross income in the case of a "trade or busi-
ness" as gross receipts, or the total amount of money received in a transac-
tion, regardless of cost or basis.83 Because the Colony decision considered
79. See Bakersfield, 568 F.3d at 771 (outlining main issue of case).
80. See id. (comparing Section 275(c) of 1939 Internal Revenue Code withSection 6501(e) (1) (A) of 1954 Internal Revenue Code). The Ninth Circuit noted
that the only changes between the two codes involved a change of the five-year
extended period to a six-year period and the replacement of "per centum" with
"percent;" otherwise, the language was identical. See id. (concluding that two pro-
visions were generally identical); accord Home Concrete & Supply, LLC v. United
States, 599 F. Supp. 2d 678, 684 (E.D.N.C. 2008) ("It is correct to say that the
language of § 275(c) is virtually identical to a portion of § 6501(e)(1)(A)."). The
Ninth Circuit also found that the 1939 Code, like the current one, defined gross
income as including gains from property deals and would be calculated by the
gross proceeds from the deal (gross proceeds) minus the adjusted basis in the
property. See Bakersfield, 568 F.3d at 771 (comparing 26 U.S.C. § 22(a) (1934 &
Supp. V), to 26 U.S.C. § 61(a) (2006) and 26 C.F.R. § 1.61-1(a) (2009)).
81. See id. at 772 ("Given this definition of 'gross income,' disputes arose as to
whether the extended limitations period of § 275(c) applied if a taxpayer over-
stated its basis."); see also id. (providing background on pre-Colony cases involving
omissions from gross income under 1939 Internal Revenue Code). The Ninth Cir-
cuit adopted the majority position in a case where it determined that a taxpayer
who reported overseas income on his return but erroneously excluded it from
gross income was not subject to the extended statute of limitations. See Slaff v.
Comm'r, 220 F.2d 65, 68 (9th Cir. 1955) ("From the day these returns were filed it
was plainly revealed that this taxpayer had earned $3,300 and said amount was
claimed to be exempt. . . . How such a plain statement can be construed as an
omission is difficult for us to understand under the circumstances."); see also
Uptegrove Lumber Co. v. Comm'r, 204 F.2d 570, 573 (3d Cir. 1953) (holding that
corporate taxpayer did not omit from gross income when it erroneously inflated
cost of goods sold due to general computational error). For the minority position
on the issue, see Reis v. Comm'r, 142 F.2d 900, 903 (6th Cir. 1944) (allowing five-
year extended statute of limitations where taxpayer adopted incorrect basis that
resulted in understatement of more than twenty-five percent of properly stated
gross income on return).
82. See Bakersfield, 568 F.3d at 772 (citing Benson v. Comm'r, 560 F.3d 1133,1135-36 (9th Cir. 2009) (referring to § 275(c) as "the predecessor statute to§ 6501 (e) (1) (A)").
83. See id. (noting additions to § 6501 (e) (1) (A) in 1954 Code). As such, an
overstatement of basis cannot constitute an omission from gross income where the
taxpayer is a trade or business. See id. (explaining Clause (i)). Congress also ad-
ded Clause (ii), the adequate disclosure provision, in the 1954 Code, but this addi-
tion is not at issue in Bakersfield. For a discussion of cases that interpret the
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an identical issue in the context of a statute with substantially identical
language, the court concluded that the Colony decision should control.8 4
2. The Plain Language of Section 6501(e)(1)(A) Does Not Contradict Colony
Notwithstanding Colony, the Service argued that the plain language of
Section 6501(e) (1) (A) compels the court to hold that when a taxpayer
overstates basis, the information reported on the taxpayer's tax return
omits an "amount properly includable from gross income," thereby trig-
gering the extended statute of limitations.8 5 Other courts had sustained
this plain language argument, but because the Supreme Court in Colony
explicitly avoided construing the 1954 Code in its opinion, the Ninth Cir-
cuit rejected this argument in favor of deferring to Colony's interpretation
of identical language under the predecessor statute.8 6 Further, the Ser-
vice contended that, because the addition of Clause (i) to Section
6501(e) (1) (A) (i) removes basis as a component of gross income in the
case of a trade or business, the general rule of Section 6501(e) (1) (A) is
that an overstatement of basis is an omission from gross income.8 7 The
court acknowledged that the Service's position was reasonable, but con-
consequences of the addition of Clause (ii) to Section 6501(e) (1) (A), see supra
note 57 and accompanying text.
84. See Bakersfield, 568 F.3d at 772 (quoting Colony, 357 U.S. at 33) (determin-
ing Colony to hold that extended statute of limitations applies to taxpayer who
"actually omitted some income receipt or accrual in his calculation of gross in-
come, and not more generally to errors in that computation arising from other
causes"). The Ninth Circuit determined that, because the taxpayer in Bakersfield
did not omit any income receipt or accrual in its gross income calculation, and
reported the full amount of its receipts from the sale of the oil and gas property, its
overstatement of basis alone could not trigger the extended statute of limitations.
See id. (determining calculus for omission from gross income under Section
6501 (e) (1) (A)).
85. See id. (describing IRS's plain language argument). The IRS argued that
the Internal Revenue Code defines gross income as all income from any source
and includes income from property deals. See id. at 774 ("Because gain is deter-
mined by subtracting basis from the amount realized, the IRS argues that, under a
natural reading of § 6501(e) (1) (A), a taxpayer can 'omit from gross income an
amount properly includable therein' by overstating its basis."); see also 26 U.S.C.
§ 61 (a) (defining gross income as "all income from whatever source derived"); id.
§ 61(a) (3) (specifying that gross income includes "[g]ains derived from dealings
in property").
86. Compare Bakersfield, 568 F.3d at 774 (citing cases in agreement with IRS
position on plain language issue), with Salman Ranch Ltd. v. United States, 79 Fed.
Cl. 189, 200 (2007) ("Instead, the court must import the meaning of 'gross in-
come' in the Internal Revenue Code in order to ascertain what constitutes 'omits
from gross income."'), rev'd, 573 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2009), and Brandon Ridge
Partners v. United States, No. 8:06-cv-1340-T-24MAP, 2007 WL 2209129, at *7
(M.D. Fla. July 30, 2007) ("In the case of a trade or business, 'gross income' is
equated with gross receipts. Otherwise, 'gross income' means those items listed in
Section 61(a) . . . ... (quoting Insulglass Corp. v. Comm'r, 84 T.C. 203, 210
(1985))).
87. See Bakersfield, 568 F.3d at 775 ("As noted above, subparagraph (i)
removes basis as a component of the definition of 'gross income' in the case of a
trade or business, and therefore taxpayers in a trade or business can never be sub-
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cluded that it contradicted Colony's construction of identical language in
Section 6501(e) (1) (A)'s predecessor statute.8 8
3. Clause (i) Did Not Materially Alter Section 6501(e)(1)(A)
Next, the Service argued that the addition of Clause (i) materially
altered Section 6 5 01(e) (1) (A), and that application of Colony to Section
6 501(e) (1) (A) would render Clause (i) superfluous.8 9 The court dis-
agreed that the addition of Clause (i) materially altered the language of
Section 6501(e) (1) (A), finding that Congress was presumably aware of the
dispute over Section 275(c) when it enacted Section 6501(e) (1) (A).9o
The court concluded that Congress could have expressly defined the term
"omits" if it wanted to overrule the line of cases that concluded, consistent
with Colony, that "omits" does not include overstatements of basis.9 ' The
ject to the six-year statute of limitations period merely because they overstated
their basis.").
88. See id. (dismissing IRS's argument).
89. See id. ("The IRS points out that if we apply Colony to the main section of§ 6501(e) (1) (A) . . . then no taxpayer that overstates its basis will be subject to the
six-year limitations period."). Accordingly, the IRS argued, because subparagraph(i)'s special definition of "gross income" as gross receipts also prohibits an over-
statement of basis from being an omission from gross income in the case of a trade
or business, applying Colony to Section 6501(e) (1) (A) would render Clause (i) su-
perfluous. See id. ("[I]t is a cardinal principle of statutory construction that a court
must give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute . . . ." (quoting In
re Bonner Mall P'ship, 2 F.3d 899, 908 (9th Cir. 1993))).
90. See id. at 776 ("In enacting the 1954 Code, Congress was presumably aware
of the dispute over the interpretation of § 275(c), and it could have expressly ad-
ded a definition of 'omits' if it wanted to overrule the cases that concluded ... that
'omits' did not include an overstatement of basis.").
91. See id. (noting that Congress left language in Section 6501 (e) (1) (A) iden-
tical to language of predecessor Section 275(c) that Colony construed). The court
noted that, as a general rule, words in a new statute identical to words in a prior
statute should be construed as having the same meaning. See id. (citing SINGER &
SINGER, supra note 52, § 22.33) (explaining principle of statutory interpretation);
Benson v. Comm'r, 560 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir. 2009) (applying Colony to Section
6501(e)(1) (A)); cf United States v. O'Brien, 542 F.3d 921, 926 (1st Cir. 2008)("There is no evidence that the breaking up of the sentence into the present subdi-
visions or recasting of language was anything more than the current trend.");
Strange v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 206, 210 n. 4 (2000) (noting decision of case that
interpreted predecessor state income tax statute, which controlled interpretation
of successor statute with substantially similar language); Lilly v. Comm'r, 45 T.C.
168, 175 (1965) ("While Section 101 is applicable in the instant case . . . peti-
tioner's husband having died after the enactment of the 1954 Code, we think the
same reasoning should apply here as was applied under Section 22(b)(1) of the
1939 Code for the two sections are substantially the same."). The Ninth Circuit
determined that Congress intended to clarify, rather than rewrite, the language of
Section 6501 (e) (1) (A) by adding subparagraph (i). See Bakersfield, 568 F.3d at 776(noting that redundancies in drafting are not unusual and that "presumption
against redundancy applies more weakly in situations .. . in which the provision is
potentially rendered superfluous by language contained in a separate, later stat-
ute"). The court concluded that Congress never intended to alter the generaljudicial construction of "omits" just because it clarified that an overstatement of
basis is not an omission in the case of a trade or business. See id. (determining
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court also disagreed with the Service's position that applying Colony to Sec-
tion 6501(e) (1) (A) would render Clause (i) superfluous, reasoning that
Clause (i) remained dispositive in cases where the amount omitted is not
in dispute-whether or not the court accepted the Service's interpretation
of Colony.9 2
4. Colony Applies to All Taxpayers
Next, the Service argued that if Colony did apply to Section
6501(e) (1) (A), then Colony's interpretation should only apply in the case
of a trade or business.9 3 The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument because
the Supreme Court in Colony expressly avoided construing the 1954 Inter-
nal Revenue Code, and in doing so, never implied that its holding was
limited to taxpayers engaged in a trade or business.94 According to the
trade or business rule to be clarification, rather than exception, to main Section
6501(e) (1) (A) extended statute of limitations).
92. See id. (explaining that Colony applies only to amount omitted, not to total
gross income stated on return, while Clause (i) affects both amounts). The court
explained that Section 6501 (e)(1)(A) requires a comparison of (1) the gross in-
come omitted with (2) the gross income listed on the return; if the first value
divided by the second value exceeds twenty-five percent, the six-year statute of limi-
tations applies. See id. (explaining gross income omission calculation formula).
The court provided that Colony only defines what constitutes an omission from
gross income. See id. (limiting Colony's application to omissions, rather than total
gross income reported). Accordingly, in cases where the amount of omitted gross
income is not in dispute, only the second value-the gross income stated on the
return-determines whether there has been an omission that meets the twenty-five
percent threshold. See id. (finding that determination of whether taxpayer's omis-
sion meets requirements for extended statute of limitations will depend on
whether taxpayer should be treated generally or as trade or business under Clause
(i)). Because Clause (i) guides the computation of gross income stated on the
return, it will prove dispositive in such cases. See id. (comparing operation of main
rule to operation of trade or business exception); Hoffman v. Comm'r, 119 T.C.
140, 148, 150 (2002) (noting that issue hinges on whether taxpayer was considered
trade or business under Clause (i) where taxpayer did not dispute omitted amount
of gross income, and holding that because IRS did not meet burden of proving
taxpayer's gross receipts, six-year limitations period did not apply); Insulglass
Corp. v. Comm'r, 84 T.C. 203, 209-10 (1985) ("[T]he gross receipts test would
necessarily not be applied in view of the broad sweep of [S]ection
6501 (e) (1) (A)."); cf Connelly v. Comm'r, 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 49 (1982) ("Whether
or not a person is engaged in a trade or business . . . is a question of fact which
requires an analysis of all the surrounding facts and circumstances.").
93. See Bakersfield, 568 F.3d at 774-75 (detailing IRS's argument that Colony
should only apply to trade or business exception). Specifically, the IRS argued
that, because the main section of Section 275(c) that the Supreme Court inter-
preted in Colony was ambiguous, the main section of Section 6501(e) (1) (A) is also
ambiguous; therefore the "unambiguous language" of Section 6501 (e) (1) (A) must
be Clause (i), and Colony's interpretation of Section 275(c) must apply only to
taxpayers in a trade or business. See id. (explaining IRS's argument).
94. See id. (citing Colony, Inc. v. Comm'r 357 U.S. 28, 37 (1958)) (discussing
taxpayers only in context of trade or business when quoting Section
6501(e) (1) (A) (i)). "Without doing more than noting the speculative debate be-
tween the parties as to whether Congress manifested an intention to clarify or to
change the 1939 Code, we observe that the conclusion we reach is in harmony with
21
Audet: One Case to Rule Them All: The Ninth Circuit in Bakersfield Appli
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2010
VILLANovA LAW REVIEW
Ninth Circuit, under a fair reading of Colony, the Supreme Court issued a
construction of Section 275(c) that was not limited to any specific type of
taxpayer.9 5 Therefore, because the Supreme Court in Colony had rejected
similar arguments that the Service advanced in Bakersfield, the Ninth Cir-
cuit, despite acknowledging the reasonableness of the Service's position,
refused to allow the extended statute of limitations under Section
6501(e) (1) (A). 96
IV. IN THE AFTERMATH OF BAKERSFIELD, THE "Two TowERS" OF JUDICIAL
AND ADMINISTRATIVE SOLUTIONS TO SON OF BOSS ABUSERS
LED TO TREASURY DECISION 9466
Along with the Ninth Circuit's decision in Bakersfield, the Federal Cir-
cuit's recent decision in Salman Ranch Ltd. v. United States exemplified the
need for clarification, modification, or overruling of Colony in the context
of modern tax shelters.9 7 In Salman Ranch, the Federal Circuit applied the
Colony holding to all taxpayers generally, just as the Ninth Circuit did in
Bakersfield.9 8 Unlike the Ninth Circuit in Bakersfield, however, the Federal
Circuit in Salman Ranch explicitly noted that the case involved a Son of
the unambiguous language of § 6501(e) (1) (A) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954." Id. at 774 (citing Colony, 357 U.S. at 37).
95. See id. (dismissing issue of trade or business exception).
96. See id. at 778 ("However sensible the IRS's argument may be that a tax-
payer can 'omit .. . an amount' of gain by overstating its basis, this argument is
foreclosed by Colony. The Court . . . rejected the same interpretation the IRS is
proposing in this case."). The Ninth Circuit then noted that the IRS might pro-
mulgate a regulation that reinterprets an ambiguous Code provision, even if that
regulation runs contrary to the "best reading" of the provision. See Nat'l Cable &
Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982-83 (2005) ("Since[Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)]
teaches that a court's opinion as to the best reading of an ambiguous statute an
agency is charged with administering is not authoritative, the agency's decision to
construe that statute differently from a court does not say that the court's holding
was legally wrong."); accord Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. Comm'r, 515 F.3d 162, 170(3d Cir. 2008) (citing M.C.I. Telecomms. Corp. v. Bell Atlantic-Pa., 271 F.3d 491,
515-16 (3d Cir. 2001) ("If, however, the statutory provision is ambiguous, such
ambiguity is viewed as an implicit congressional delegation of authority to an
agency, allowing the agency to fill the gap with a reasonable regulation."); see also
Jeremiah Coder, IRS Strikes Back Against Judicial Losses in Overstated Basis Cases, 125
TAX NoTEs 19, 19 (2009) ("The temporary regulations are not all that surprising
given the Ninth Circuit's hint that it believed the government's position was the
right one, but that it was constrained by Colony.").
97. See Salman Ranch Ltd. v. United States, 573 F.3d 1362, 1377 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (granting summary judgment to taxpayers because IRS's assertion of tax
deficiency was untimely under Section 6501(e) (1) (A)'s three-year statute of limita-
tions); see also id. at 1382 (Newman, J., dissenting) ("However, it is highly relevant
that the nature of the erroneous basis claim herein is markedly different from the
more conventional basis error in Colony, and no 'clue' to this different nature was
presented with the Salman Ranch returns.").
98. See id. at 1377 (majority opinion) ("Our holding today is consistent with
the June 17, 2007 decision of the Ninth Circuit in Bakersfield Energy Partners.").
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of the extended statute of limitations against a tax shelter abuser.99
In Salman Ranch, the Salman Ranch partners had engaged in a series
of short sales, transferred the resulting obligations to the Salman Ranch
partnership, improperly inflated the basis in partnership assets, then sold
the assets, and understated their gross income as a result.' 0 0 The Salman
Ranch partnership tax schedule, issued to each partner for the taxable
year in which the assets were sold, reported each partner's proportionate
share of income from the ranch but did not disclose any information re-
lated to the transfer of the short sale proceeds or obligations to the
Salman Ranch partnership.' 0 Nearly six years later, the Service deter-
mined that the partners had understated their capital gains by a combined
99. See id. at 1365 ("In other words, the FPAA asserted that a series of sham
transactions . . . allegedly created an improper tax shelter."); see also id. at 1378
(Newman, J., dissenting) ("The IRS stated that 'Salman Ranch Ltd. was availed of
for improper tax avoidance purposes . . . through a transaction that was substan-
tially similar to . . . a procedure that the IRS calls 'Son of BOSS.'"); cf id. at 1381
("In contrast with the Salman Ranch transactions, in Bakersfield as in Colony the
items of basis were directly related to the product sold . . . . Transactions [in
Treasury Notes] that are economically meaningless . . . are not . . . validated by
simply designating the costs as 'basis' for unrelated property.").
100. See id. at 1364 (majority opinion) (outlining steps of partnership's tax
avoidance scheme). For a discussion of the mechanics of short sales and the statu-
tory framework that made Son of BOSS tax shelters possible, see supra note 6 and
accompanying text.
First, the Salman Ranch partners entered into a short sale transaction involving
United States Treasury Notes which gave rise to an obligation to replace the bor-
row security known as a "short position." See id. (citing Zlotnick v. TIE Commc'ns,
836 F.2d 818, 820 (3d Cir. 1988)) (describing typical short sale). The short sales
generated $10.9 million in cash proceeds, which the tax matters partner trans-
ferred, along with the accompanying short position, to the Salman Ranch partner-
ship. See id. (outlining tax shelter transactions). The partnership then closed the
short position on the Treasury Notes for $10.9 million and used that money to pay
back the party from which the partners had borrowed the Notes. See id. (same).
The partners then transferred a majority of their Salman Ranch interests to three
newly formed family partnerships, which caused a technical termination of Salman
Ranch. See id. (describing Section 708(b)(1)(B) technical termination). Next, the
partners made an election under Sections 754 and 743(b) (1) to adjust Salman
Ranch's basis in a ranch property it owned to $6,850,276-a value that reflected
the original basis in the ranch plus a portion of the value of the short-sale cash
proceeds contributed to Salman Ranch. See id. (describing adjustment of basis in
ranch property). The partners then sold the ranch for a gross sales price of
$7,188,858, while reporting a basis of $6,850,276, for a net taxable gain of only
$338,312. See id. (describing sale of Salman Ranch partnership property).
101. See Salman Ranch Ltd. v. United States, 79 Fed. Cl. 189, 191 (2007)
("There is no indication in the partners' individual Form 1040 returns ... that the
partnership had assumed liability to cover the short position in Treasury Notes."),
rev'd, 573 F.3d 1362. The Federal Circuit in Salman Ranch adopted the Court of
Federal Claims's statement of the facts of the case. See Salman Ranch, 573 F.3d at
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$4,567,949 on the sale of the ranch property.10 2 The Federal Circuit,
strictly adhering to the Colony rule, overruled the Court of Federal Claims
and held that the six-year extended statute of limitations did not apply,
making the Service's assessment of tax on the partnership untimely.' 0 3
Since the Bakersfield and Salman Ranch decisions, the Tax Court has
adopted the Colony rule as applicable to all taxpayers.10 4 Perhaps more
importantly, the Federal Circuit's strict adoption of Colony in Salman Ranch
made taxpayers who overstated their basis in assets through Son of BOSS
transactions more likely to file their claims in the Court of Federal Claims
in order to escape the six-year extended statute of limitations.1 0 5 The Fed-
eral Circuit's strict adherence to the Colony rule allowed tax shelter abusers
to escape tax liability by disclosing the amounts of their transactions but
concealing the substance, nature, origin, and destination of those
102. See id. at 1365 (detailing IRS's recalculation of partners' tax liabilities
after sale of ranch).
103. See id. at 1377 ("[W]e conclude that the Supreme Court's interpretation
of the language 'omits from gross income' . . . controls the interpretation of the
identical language in [Section 6501(e) (1) (A)]. . . . For this reason, we hold that
the alleged overstatement of the basis of Salman Ranch by the Partnership did not
constitute an omission from gross income . . . .").
104. See, e.g., Intermountain Ins. Serv. v. Comm'r, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 144
(2009) ("[The parties] disagree whether a basis overstatement by Intermountain
could have extended the period of limitations for assessing tax .. . Our opinion in
[Bakersfield] is directly on point."); Wilmington Partners, LP v. Comm'r, 98 T.C.M.
(CCH) 138 (2009) ("The Court previously decided . . . that respondent may not
assess as to 1999-2 any income tax . . . because the applicable limitations period
had expired. The Court stated that [Bakersfield] controlled our decision, and the
Court rejected the Commissioner's invitation to overrule Bakersfield."); Beard v.
Comm'r, No. 13372-06, 2009 WL 2460768, at *4 (T.C. Aug. 11, 2009) ("We assume
that petitioners overstated the bases of their S corporations .... Under Colony and
Bakersfield, petitioners did not omit income from their return such as would subject
them to the extended period of limitations."); see also Coder, supra note 6, at 760
("The Tax Court is unlikely to change its position, especially given that its ruling in
Bakersfield was released as a division opinion. Just this month in a memorandum
opinion, the court invoked Bakersfield and the Supreme Court in Colony."). The
Tax Court will adopt the rule of the circuit in which the case is appealable if the
circuit has ruled on the issue. See Coder, supra note 6, at 759 ("In the Fifth Circuit,
the IRS clings to Phinney v. Chambers. . . as precedent for applying a six-year statute
of limitations period in overstated basis cases.").
105. See id. ("[Phillip A.] Pillar [of Greenberg Traurig LLP] agreed that the
Federal Circuit decision will provide a significant barrier for further government
efforts to recapture momentum on the issue."). For refund suits, the United States
Court of Federal Claims serves as an alternative forum to any district court in
which the taxpayer may bring suit. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (1) (2006) ("The dis-
trict courts shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the United States
Court of Federal Claims, of . .. [a]ny civil action against the United States for the
recovery of any internal-revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally
assessed or collected. . . ."). The Federal Circuit's holdings serve as binding prece-
dent on the Court of Federal Claims. See Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States, 454
F.3d 1340, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing First Hartford Corp. Pension Plan & Trust
v. United States, 194 F.3d 1279, 1290 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1999)) ("There can be no
question that the Court of Federal Claims is required to follow the precedent of
the Supreme Court, our court, and our predecessor court, the Court of Claims.").
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amounts in ways that put the Service at a disadvantage in detecting non-
compliance.1 0 6 While Congress has closed the statutory loopholes that ini-
tially allowed the Son of BOSS tax shelter, the legislative solutions are not
retroactive and thus will not apply to many already existing cases. 107
A. The Judicial Solution: Will the Supreme Court Overrule Colony and Cast
It into the Fires of Mount Doom?
A change in judicial construction of Section 6501(e) (1) (A) would al-
low courts to apply the extended statute of limitations against tax shelter
abusers that would otherwise meet the superficial requirements of the Col-
ony decision.10 8 The Ninth Circuit in Bakersfield reaffirmed Colony as the
starting point for determining the meaning of the term "omits" in Section
106. See Salman Ranch, 573 F.3d at 1383 (Newman, J., dissenting) ("The tax-
payers herein omitted over 25 percent of their gross income, but did not provide
sufficient information to apprise the Commissioner of the nature and amount of
the omission.").
107. See generally Matthew Roche, Comment, Son of Boss and the Troubling Leg-
acy of Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, 58 CATH. U. L. REv. 263, 270 (2008) (describ-
ing congressional efforts to combat Son of BOSS tax shelter abusers). In 2004,
Congress passed the American Jobs Creation Act, which amended the existing tax
shelter provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. See American Jobs Creation Act
of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C.
§ 6501 (2006)). The Act created a separate statute of limitations for certain "listed
transactions" that tolled from the date of disclosure of the transactions, rather
than from the date that the taxpayer filed the return. See 26 U.S.C. § 6501(c) (10)
("[T]he time for assessment of any tax imposed by this title with respect to such
transaction shall not expire before ... the date on which the Secretary is furnished
the information so required . . . ."); Roche, supra, at 292 ("Transactions that are
the same as or substantially similar to the transactions described in this Notice
2000-44 are identified as 'listed transactions' for the purposes of § 1.60114T(b) (2)
of the Temporary Income Tax Regulations and § 301.6111-2T(b) (2) of the Tem-
porary Procedure and Administration Regulations." (citing I.R.S. Notice 2000-44,
2000-2 C.B. 255)). The Act made no changes to the general extended statute of
limitations under Section 6501(e) (1) (A). See Roche, supra, at 292 (discussing
changes to Internal Revenue Code under American Jobs Creation Act). Compare
26 U.S.C. § 6501(e) (1) (A) ("If the taxpayer omits from gross income an amount
properly includable therein . . . ."), with Phinney v. Chambers, 392 F.2d 680, 683
(5th Cir. 1968) ("If the taxpayer omits from gross income an amount properly
includible therein . . . ." (quoting Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
§ 6501(e) (1) (A))). The Treasury Department specifically identified the Son of
BOSS tax shelter and related transactions that use overstated bases to generate
losses lacking in economic substance as impermissible "listed transactions." See
Roche, supra, at 292 (describing nature of listed transactions). The Act, however,
did not specifically address Colony's construction of the word "omits" in the general
context of Section 6501(e) (1) (A) and only imposed the disclosure-based statute of
limitations on listed transactions. See id. at 299-300 ("Therefore, Congress should
amend § 6501(e) (1) (A) to ensure uniform treatment of what constitutes an 'omis-
sion of gross income.'").
108. Cf Bakersfield Energy Partners v. Comm'r, 568 F.3d 767, 778 (9th Cir.
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6501 (e) (1) (A), so any judicial change in the law must address Colony. 09
Even though colorable arguments exist that Colony was wrongly decided, in
light of stare decisis principles in decisions involving statutory interpreta-
tion, the Court is unlikely to revisit Colony.110
Even if Colony were wrongly decided, the Court has evinced a particu-
lar reluctance to overrule its prior statutory interpretation decisions."'
109. See id. ("However sensible the IRS's argument may be that a taxpayer can
'omit ... an amount' of gain by overstating its basis, this argument is foreclosed by
Colony.").
110. See Grapevine Imps., Ltd. v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 505, 510 (2007)
("[A] few questions linger as to the correctness of the Supreme Court's ruling.").
The Supreme Court's preference for construction of statutory words according to
their plain meaning may have led the Court to wrongly decide the Colony case by
disregarding the context and policy concerns behind Section 275(c)'s language.
See Old Colony R.R. Co. v. Comm'r, 284 U.S. 552, 560 (1932) (" [T]he plain, obvi-
ous and rational meaning of a statute is always to be preferred to any curious,
narrow, hidden sense that nothing but the exigency of a hard case and the ingenu-
ity and study of an acute and powerful intellect would discover." (quoting Lynch v.
Alworth-Stephens Co., 267 U.S. 364, 370 (1925))). In Colony, the Supreme Court
first addressed the definition of the word "omits" by looking to contemporary dic-
tionary definitions, despite the fact that dictionary definitions have sometimes led
to controversy. See, e.g., Pioneer Inv. Servs. v. Brunswick Assocs. LP, 507 U.S. 380,
396 n.14 (1993) ("Faced with a choice between our own precedent and Black's
Law Dictionary, we adhere to the former."); County of Wash. v. Gunther, 452 U.S.
161, 198 n.10 (1981) (Rehnquist,J., dissenting) ("Rather than 'make a fortress out
of the dictionary,' the Court should instead attempt to implement the legislative
intent of Congress."); Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S.
205, 247 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that Congress comprised
"neither insurance experts nor dictionary editors"). The Court in Colony noted
that the word "omits" was ambiguous and that dictionary definitions that the tax-
payer advanced could not resolve the ambiguity. See Colony, Inc. v. Comm'r, 357
U.S. 28, 33 (1958) ("Although we are inclined to think that the statute on its face
lends itself more plausibly to the taxpayer's interpretation, it cannot be said that
the language is ambiguous."). The Court looked to the legislative history to re-
solve the ambiguity, and determined that Congress intended the extended statute
of limitations to apply only where taxpayers omitted entire items from their re-
turns. See id. at 36 ("We think that in enacting [S]ection 275(c) Congress mani-
fested no broader purpose than to give the Commissioner an additional two years
to investigate tax returns in cases where, because of a taxpayer's omission to report
some taxable item. . . .") (emphasis added). The Court, however, ignored legislative
history that suggested the statute should apply in cases of understatements of gross
income. See Richards, supra note 46, at 311 ("However, both the House and Senate
reports refer to a situation where the taxpayer 'understates gross income' and
thereby falls within the terms of Section 275(c)."); see also S. REP. No. 558, at 43
(1934) (providing example of gross income understatement that would trigger ex-
tended statute of limitations). Notwithstanding certain legislative history provi-
sions, the Court employed a definition of "omits" that failed to consider the
entirety of the context and policy concerns behind the enactment of Section
275(c). Cf Samuel A. Thumma & Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Has Become a
Fortress: The United States Supreme Court's Use of Dictionaries, 47 Burr. L. REv. 227, 293
(1999) ("Accordingly, although a descriptive dictionary may set forth possible al-
ternative definitions for a term, it cannot provide the definitive definition for what
that term actually means in a specific context.").
111. See Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977) ("In considering
whether to cut back or abandon the Hanover Shoe rule, we must bear in mind that
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For instance, in John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States,1 12 the Supreme
Court declined to overrule its earlier decisions holding that a statute of
limitations period on claims against the Government was an absolute juris-
dictional requirement that a court should address sua sponte if not raised
by the parties.' 1 3 The petitioner in John R. argued that the Court should
overturn the existing rule in light of changes in law that required courts to
place greater weight on the equitable importance of treating the Govern-
ment like other litigants, coupled with a decreased congressional emphasis
in protecting public funds.' 14 The Court upheld the existing rule and
determined that, even if the Government could not show that it relied on
earlier case law, principles of stare decisis dictated that the Court value
legal stability over pursuit of the correct rule.1 1 5 Conversely, in State Oil
Co. v. Khan,$16 the Supreme Court overruled its prior holding that vertical
maximum price fixing was per se unlawful under the Sherman Antitrust
Act.' 1 7 The Court determined that stare decisis was not an "inexorable
considerations of stare decisis weigh heavily in the area of statutory construction,
where Congress is free to change this Court's interpretation of its legislation."),
superseded by state statutes as recognized in California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93,
97-98 (1989); cf Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974) ("Since we deal with
a constitutional question, we are less constrained by the principle of stare decisis
than we are in other areas of the law."), overruled on other grounds by Will v. Mich.
Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989). But see Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808,
828 (1991) ("Considerations in favor of stare decisis are at their acme in cases
involving property and contract rights, where reliance interests are involved; the
opposite is true in cases such as the present one involving procedural and eviden-
tiary rules.") (internal citations omitted).
112. 552 U.S. 130 (2008).
113. See id. at 139 (declining to overrule previous decisions interpreting stat-
ute where Congress has "acquiesced" to Court's interpretation over many years).
The Court's previous decisions determined that courts had a duty to raise statute
of limitations issues whether the parties pled the issues or not. See, e.g., Soriano v.
United States, 352 U.S. 270, 273 (1957) ("It has been settled . .. that the Congress
in creating the Court of Claims restricted that court's jurisdiction . .. only in cer-
tain classes of claims and that no others may be asserted against it, including
'claims which are declared barred if not asserted within the time limited by stat-
ute.'"); Finn v. United States, 123 U.S. 227, 232 (1887) ("The duty of the court,
under such circumstances, whether limitation was pleaded or not, was to dismiss
the petition .... ); Kendall v. United States, 107 U.S. 123, 125 (1883) ("For in-
stance, where it appears in the case that the claim is not one for which . . . a
judgment can be given against the United States, it is the duty of the court to raise
the question whether it is done by plea or not. To that class may be referred
claims which are declared barred if not asserted within the time limited by
statute.").
114. See John R., 552 U.S. at 136-39 (presenting arguments of petitioner).
115. See id. at 139 ("To overturn a decision settling one such matter simply
because we might believe that decision is no longer 'right' would inevitably reflect
a willingness to reconsider others. . . . [T]hat willingness could itself threaten to
substitute disruption . . . for necessary legal stability. We have not found here any
factors that might overcome these considerations.") (emphasis added).
116. 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
117. See id. at 22 (considering importance of stare decisis in statutory interpre-
tation decisions but nonetheless overruling prior precedent interpreting Sherman
2010] NorE 435
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command," at least in the area of antitrust law." 8 In reaching its holding,
the Court balanced stare decisis concerns with competing interests evident
in the Court's prior antitrust decisions, such as recognizing changed cir-
cumstances and adopting the Court's own experiences to such changes.' 19
In consideration of the general practice of using common law to shape the
broad mandate of the Sherman Act, the Court overruled its prior decision
and held that vertical maximum price fixing was no longer per se unrea-
sonable, and instead should be evaluated under a reasonableness
inquiry.120
The Colony decision is more similar to prior decisions upheld in John
R., rather than the decision overruled in State Oil.121 Therefore, the Su-
preme Court will probably not overrule Colony.122 First, like the prior de-
cisions in John R., Colony represents a longstanding interpretation of a
relatively unchanged statute that Congress has, arguably, implicitly ac-
cepted by leaving the statutory language unchanged.' 2 3 Second, unlike
the Sherman Antitrust Act in State Oil, no authority exists to support the
Act). Previously, the Court had determined that a supplier's vertical maximum
price controls on distributors were per se illegal because the supplier might set the
prices too low for the distributor to offer necessary or desired services. See Al-
brecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152 (1968) ("But schemes to fix maximum
prices, by substituting the perhaps erroneous judgment of a seller for the forces of
the competitive market, may severely intrude upon the ability of buyers to compete
and survive in that market."), overruled by State Oil, 522 U.S. at 3.
118. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (noting stare decisis "is
a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest deci-
sion") (citation omitted).
119. See Khan, 522 U.S. at 22 (noting that developments in case law, econom-
ics, and academic thought have greatly diminished force of Court's prior holding).
120. See id. at 21 ("Albrecht has been widely criticized since its inception.").
121. Compare John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 135,
139 (2008) ("The statute's language has changed slightly since Kendall was decided
in 1883, but we do not see how any changes in language make a difference
here.... To overturn a decision settling one such matter simply because we might
believe that decision is no longer 'right' would inevitably reflect a willingness to
reconsider others."), with Bakersfield Energy Partners, LP v. Comm'r, 568 F.3d
767, 775 (9th Cir. 2009) ("Unfortunately for the IRS, however, it is also directly
contrary to Colony's construction of the same language in the predecessor statute,§ 275(c).").
122. See Coder, supra note 6, at 760-61 (discussing extent to which Colony
should control interpretation of 1954 rather than 1939 Code, and quoting profes-
sor arguing against holding Colony inapplicable to 1954 Code, stating, "[t]he real
weakness of the government's position ... is the lack of a strong tax policy argu-
ment for its rationale that Colony has to be understood in terms of its facts.").
123. Compare john R., 552 U.S. at 136 ("This Court does not 'presume' that the
1948 revision 'worked a change in the underlying substantive law unless an intent
to make such a change is clearly expressed.' . . . We can find no such expression of
intent here.... Thus, it is not surprising that nearly a decade after the revision, the
Court [cited the prior decision] . . . ."), with Bakersfield, 568 F.3d at 775 ("Congress
did not change the language in the body of § 6501(e) (1) (A), which is identical to
the language of § 275(c) that the Supreme Court construed in Colony. As a gen-
eral rule, we construe words in a new statute that are identical to words in a prior
statute as having the same meaning.").
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proposition that Congress intended that courts use the common law to
continuously shape the Internal Revenue Code to adapt to changing cir-
cumstances in tax administration. 1 24 Third, unlike the prior holding in
State Oil, which courts and commentators almost universally criticized and
diminished, the Colony holding has not been as vigorously questioned. 12 5
Accordingly, the Supreme Court is likely to find that stare decisis concerns
outweigh any other factors, and is unlikely to overrule its prior decision in
Colony.12 6
B. The Administrative Solution: Did the Service Cast Colony into the Depths
of Khazad-Dun with Treasury Decision 9466?
On August 24, 2009, the Service issued Treasury Decision 9466: a set
of temporary regulations that limit the Colony gross receipts test to cases
involving the trade or business exception.12 7 Some procedural irregulari-
ties in the regulations' promulgation, however, may lead courts to refuse
to grant the new rules deference as legislative regulations.128
The regulations clarified that an overstatement of basis, leading to an
understatement of gross income, is an omission from gross income for the
purposes of the extended statute of limitations for both partnerships and
124. Compare Nat'l Soc'y of Prof I Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688
(1978) (interpreting Sherman Antitrust Act and determining that Congress "ex-
pected the courts to give shape to the statute's broad mandate by drawing on com-
mon-law tradition"), with Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. Comm'r, 515 F.3d 162, 172 (3d
Cir. 2008) ("Chevron recognizes the notion that the IRS is in a superior position to
make judgments concerning the administration of the ambiguities in its enabling
statute.") (emphasis added).
125. Compare Khan, 522 U.S. at 21 ("Just as Schwinn was 'the subject of contin-
uing controversy and confusion' under the 'great weight' of scholarly criticism,
Albrecht has been widely criticized since its inception. With the views underlying
Albrecht eroded by this Court's precedent, there is not much of that decision to
salvage.") (citations omitted), with Grapevine Imps., Ltd. v. United States, 77 Fed.
Cl. 505, 509-10 (2007) ("As this court noted in its prior opinion ... several cases
have questioned the continuing viability of Colony in light of the 1954 amendments
to Section 6501(e) (1) (A)."). None of those decisions, however, came from the
Supreme Court. See CC&F W. Operations LP v. Comm'r, 273 F.3d 402, 406 n.2
(1st Cir. 2001) (doubting whether Colony applies to income outside of trade or
business exception).
126. For a discussion regarding the relative importance the Supreme Court
attaches to stare decisis concerns in statutory interpretation cases, see supra note
111 and accompanying text.
127. See T.D. 9466, 2009-43 I.R.B. 552 (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 301)
("Accordingly, outside the context of a trade or business, any basis overstatement
that leads to any understatement of gross income under [S]ection 61(a) consti-
tutes an omission of gross income for purposes of [S]ections 6501(e) (1) (A)and
6229 (c) (2).").
128. See Coder, supra note 96, at 20 ("The added wrinkle to the ongoing de-
bate over Section 6501(e) is a procedural one: Will courts allow the IRS to avoid
Colony through the issuance of new regulations?").
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individual taxpayers. 129 The regulations also expressly stated the Treasury
Department's explicit disagreement with the recent decisions in Bakersfield
and Salman Ranch. 30 The regulations justified the new rule on a theory
that Congress, by adding the trade or business special definition for gross
income under Clause (i) of Section 6501(e) (1) (A), intended to limit what
became the Colony gross receipts test only to cases involving Section 275(c)
of the 1939 Internal Revenue Code, and bar it from the current Section
6501(e)(1)(A).13 1 The new regulations codified the Treasury Depart-
ment's agreement with the holdings in prior cases that applied the broad
Section 61(a) definition of gross income to Section 6501(e) (1) (A) gener-
ally.132 Most importantly, the temporary regulations are retroactive, and
would apply to all taxable years for which the period for assessing a tax
had not expired before September 24, 2009.133 In the wake of the tempo-
rary regulations, the Service will likely file motions for reconsideration in
some cases, while appealing other recent cases where courts have applied
Colony in favor of the taxpayer.'3 4 The question is whether, in these cases,
courts will defer to Treasury Decision 9466 as a legislative regulation, and
whether they will find that retroactive application of the temporary regula-
tions is valid.' 3 5
In its fight against Son of BOSS tax shelters, the Service issued a prior
"fighting regulation" that proves instructive in evaluating the fate of Trea-
sury Decision 9466.136 The Service promulgated Regulation Section
129. See id. ("Further, in light of the different interpretations given by courts
to the meaning of Section 6501(e) (1) (A), the temporary regulations clarify the
meaning of this section.").
130. See id. ("The Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue Service dis-
agree with these courts that the Supreme Court's reading of the predecessor to
Section 6501(e) in Colony applies to Sections 6501(e)(1)(A) and 6229(c)(2).").
131. See id. (describing Congress's intent in drafting Section 6501(e) (1) (A) of
1954 Code).
132. See id. (agreeing with cases limiting Colony to trade or business excep-
tion); see also Home Concrete & Supply, LLC v. United States, 599 F. Supp. 2d 678,
690 (E.D.N.C. 2008) ("The question whether an overstatement of basis can consti-
tute an omission is, therefore, answered in the affirmative."); Brandon Ridge Part-
ners v. United States, 8:06-cv-1340-T-24MAP, 2007 WL 2209129, at *8 (M.D. Fla.
July 30, 2007) (finding omission from gross income where basis was erroneously
inflated by $3.3 million).
133. See T.D. 9466, supra note 127, at 551, 553 (outlining effective and expira-
tion dates for temporary regulations).
134. See Coder, supra note 96, at 19 (noting IRS's argument that temporary
regulations merely codify longstanding IRS litigating position regarding Colony and
should receive deference from courts).
135. For a discussion of whether courts will accord deference to Treasury De-
cision 9466 as a legislative regulation that applies retroactively, see infra notes 136-
68, and accompanying text.
136. See Coder, supra note 6, at 761 ("The Supreme Court has suggested that
it might be within the Service's power to promulgate guidance . . . taking a posi-
tion contrary to the Court's own interpretation. That move would be controver-
sial.") (internal citation omitted). A fighting regulation is one that retroactively
issues a rule to bootstrap the Service's litigating position on a particular issue. See
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1.752-6 to address a variant of the Son of BOSS scheme that abused part-
nership contingent obligation rules to inflate bases of partnership as-
sets.13 7 The regulation stipulated that any obligation, including a
contingent obligation, that creates or increases the basis of the obligor's
assets or gives rise to an immediate deduction, or that results in a nonde-
ductible expense not charged to capital, is a liability for Section 752 pur-
poses.1 38 This new regulation addressed the contingent obligation rule
that allowed the Son of BOSS tax shelter transactions to artificially inflate
basis.13 9
Courts grant two different degrees of deference to Treasury Regula-
tions, depending on whether the regulations are interpretive or legisla-
tive. 140 In addition, to determine whether a regulation can be applied
Coder, supra note 96, at 19 ("'This is the most outrageous example of bootstrap-
ping by the IRS that I have seen in the past 20 years,' said Christopher Rizek of
Caplin & Drysdale."); Sheppard, supra note 4, at 13 ("Reg. [S]ection 1.752-6 . . .
was retroactive to October 1999, the effective date of [S]ection 358(h), which was
enacted to prohibit artificial basis inflation in the corporate analogue of son-of-
BOSS.... [T]he regulation ... was controversial within the government when it
was promulgated.").
137. See, e.g., Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340, 1343 (Fed.
Cir. 2006) (outlining steps of transactions to inflate basis in assets). First, the par-
ent company reorganized a subsidiary into a special purpose entity. See id. (detail-
ing transactions). Second, the parent transferred property and contingent
liabilities to the subsidiary in exchange for stock in the subsidiary. See id. (same).
Third, the parent would sell the stock to a third party for a nominal fee. See id.
(same). The parent would treat its basis in the stock as equal to the value of the
property it transferred to the subsidiary but not reduced by the value of the contin-
gent liabilities. See id. (same). As a result, the parent would claim a loss from the
sale because the sale price of the stock was lower than the parent's basis in it. See
id. (calculating taxpayer's taxable gross income).
138. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.752-6 (2009) (" [T]he partner's basis in the partnership
is reduced (but not below the adjusted value of such interest) by the amount (de-
termined as of the date of exchange) of the liability."); Sheppard, supra note 4, at
13 (describing impact of "fighting regulation"). For a discussion of the rules
under the Internal Revenue Code for liabilities and their relation to the rules for
basis, see supra note 6.
139. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.752-6 (tying definition of "liability" for partnerships to
definition of "liability" for corporations under 26 U.S.C. § 358(h) (3), in which lia-
bilities include contingent obligations); Sheppard, supra note 4, at 13 ("[A] part-
ner's basis in the partnership would generally be reduced by the value of the
contingent liability."). To summarize, prior to the issuance of Regulation Section
1.752-6, a partner's basis in partnership interests was not reduced when the part-
ner transferred contingent obligations to the partnership, but after the regulation
was promulgated, basis was thereafter reduced accordingly. See Cemco Investors,
LLC v. United States, 515 F.3d 749, 751 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting that Regulation
Section 1.752-6 "scupper[s] the entire class of offsetting-option tax shelters . . . by
subtracting, from the partnership's basis in an asset, the value of any correspond-
ing liability") (emphasis added).
140. See generally Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund, LLC v. United States, 440 F.
Supp. 2d 608, 621 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (discussing judicial formulations of standards
of review for Treasury Regulations). An "interpretive regulation" is promulgated
under the Treasury Department's general authority under Section 7805 of the In-
ternal Revenue Code to prescribe regulations. See Snap-Drape, Inc. v. Comm'r, 98
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retroactively, several factors are considered, including: (1) whether the
taxpayer justifiably relied on settled prior law and to what extent the regu-
lation altered that law, (2) the extent that Congress implicitly approved
the prior law by enacting pertinent Internal Revenue Code provisions, (3)
whether retroactivity would advance the interest in equal treatment of sim-
ilarly situated taxpayers, and (4) whether granting retroactivity would pro-
duce unduly harsh results. 14 1
In Klamath Strategic Investment Fund, LLC v. United States, 1 4 2 the District
Court for the Eastern District of Texas found that Regulation Section
1.752-6 could not be applied retroactively to taxpayers.143 The taxpayers
in Klamath borrowed money at a large premium, contributed the loan pro-
ceeds to a partnership that also assumed the debt, sold their partnership
interests for an artificial loss, and claimed that the loss amount equaled
the loan premium amount.14 4 The Service argued that the premiums fell
under the new definition of "liabilities" provided in Regulation Section
1.752-6 and should therefore have reduced the taxpayers' basis in the part-
nership. 145 The court disagreed and found that the regulation was not
retroactive to the Klamath taxpayers because they engaged in prohibited
conduct before the regulation was issued and could justifiably rely on
prior settled law. 146
F.3d 194, 198 (5th Cir. 1996) (contrasting interpretive and legislative regulations).
A "legislative regulation" is issued under a specific grant of authority in a statutory
provision to prescribe a method of executing that statute, and it receives a higher
degree of deference than an interpretive regulation. See id. (contrasting interpre-
tive and legislative regulations). Legislative regulations receive deference such
that they have controlling weight, unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or contrary
to the underlying statute. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984) (setting forth standard for force of law deference,
known as "Chevron deference").
141. See, e.g., Snap-Drape, 98 F.3d at 202 (citing Anderson, Clayton & Co. v.
United States, 562 F.2d 972, 981 (5th Cir. 1977)) (noting that these factors should
serve as "flexible guidance" and not "rigid requirements"). The court also noted
that that list of factors is not conjunctive. See id. (rejecting Commissioner's argu-
ment that unless all four factors are present, regulation applies prospectively only).
142. 440 F. Supp. 2d 608 (E.D. Tex. 2006).
143. See id. at 626 ("However, taxpayers-like the [p]laintiffs in this case-
that engaged in conduct before issuance of any notice could justifiably rely on
Helmer and its progeny. Thus, the retroactivity of the Regulation is ineffective as to
these [p]laintiffs.").
144. See id. at 611-14 (providing details of taxpayers' loan transactions with
partnership); Sheppard, supra note 4, at 14 (describing underlying circumstances
of Klamath case).
145. See Klamath, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 619-20 (considering regulation's effect on
taxpayers' partnership liabilities).
146. See id. at 626 (considering factors of Fifth Circuit's Anderson retroactivity
test and determining that totality of circumstances dictated that regulation should
not be retroactive to taxpayers at issue). First, the court determined that twenty-
five years of consistent Service positions regarding the definition of "liability," from
the Helmer case onward, entitled the taxpayers to rely on that settled law; further,
the regulation's significant departure from that law militated against retroactivity.
See id. at 623 (considering "justifiable reliance" factor of Anderson test). Second,
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In contrast, in Cemco Investors, LLC v. United States,147 the Seventh Cir-
cuit upheld the retroactivity of the fighting regulation and ruled for the
Government in a Son of BOSS shelter case.1 4 8 In Cemco, the taxpayer pur-
chased long and short options in Euros with net premiums that canceled
each other out. 14 9 The Cemco partners, however, transferred long and
short options to Cemco Investors, a limited liability corporation, increas-
ing their basis by the amount of the long options but ignoring the offset-
ting contingent obligation of the short options in calculating their
increased basis. 15 0 The Seventh Circuit held that the transactions lacked
economic substance and affirmed the validity of the fighting regulation
because the Service had authority to issue the regulation retroactively. 15 1
The court in Cemco found that the retroactivity of Regulation Section
1.752-6 traced back to Section 309 of the Community Renewal Tax Relief
Act of 2000 because the Act authorized the Service to adopt regulations
setting out basis-reduction rules for partnerships.' 5 2
Similarly, in Clearmeadow Investments, LLC v. United States,15 3 the Court
of Federal Claims applied Regulation Section 1.752-6 retroactively in a
case where the taxpayer inflated a partnership's basis in Canadian cur-
the court noted that Congress failed to amend Section 752, which defines liabili-
ties, in the wake of the Helmer decision, which would support denying retroactivity
to the regulation. See id. (considering "congressional approval" factor of Anderson
test). Third, the court found nothing in the regulation to lead to unequal treat-
ment of taxpayers. See id. at 624 (considering "unequal results" factor of Anderson
test). Fourth, the court determined that the Service had made no mention of any
intent to change the definition of "liability" under the Code before the year 2000,
so a grant of retroactivity would weigh harshly against the taxpayer. See id. (consid-
ering "harsh result" factor of Anderson test).
147. 515 F.3d 749 (7th Cir. 2008).
148. See id. at 752 ("So Treas. Reg. § 1.752-6 applies to this deal and prevents
Cemco's investors from claiming a loss.... [T]his tax shelter was constructed after
the warning in Notice 2000-44 . . . all the regulation does is instantiate the pre-
existing norm that transactions with no economic substance don't reduce people's
taxes.").
149. See id. at 750 ("One would think from this description that the Trust ...
suffered a loss of $6,000 . . . while Cemco had neither profit nor loss.").
150. See id. (describing partners' transactions leading to inflation of basis).
151. See id. at 751 ("The Commissioner has a statutory power to disregard
transactions that lack economic substance. And the IRS has considerable latitude
in issuing regulations that specify sorts of transactions that may be looked
through."); see also Sheppard, supra note 4, at 15 ("The regulation could be retro-
active all the way back to the effective date of Section 358(h), [Judge Easterbrook]
ruled [in Cemco], because it was also an economic substance rule."). In Cemco,
Judge Easterbrook noted that such regulations avoid the need to litigate tax shel-
ters one at a time to determine whether any actually has economic substance. See
Cemco, 515 F.3d at 751 (rationalizing and justifying fighting regulation).
152. See id. at 752 (discussing statutory grant of power for Service to issue
regulations to combat partnership basis overstatement abuse).
153. 87 Fed. Cl. 509 (2009).
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rency. 154 The taxpayer in Clearmeadow engaged in a Son of BOSS tax shel-
ter by engaging in a complex series of market-linked deposit transactions,
which essentially transferred short and long contingent obligations to a
partnership, increased the partnership's basis by the long obligations but
did not reduce the basis by the short obligations, and subsequently liqui-
dated the partnership.15 5 Before liquidating, the partnership distributed
$1,000 in Canadian currency, with a basis of $2,501,000, to the taxpayer's
S-corporation, which passed through to the taxpayer, who later claimed a
portfolio loss of $1,004,040 that offset taxable gain of $921,885.156 The
Service later disallowed the basis increases in the Canadian currency and
determined that the taxpayer owed $175,870 in income tax.' 5 7 While the
Service argued that Regulation Section 1.752-6 retroactively applied to the
case, the taxpayer in Clearmeadow did not challenge the validity of the regu-
lation but rather challenged its applicability to the given facts.' 5 8 The
court implicitly affirmed the validity and retroactivity of the regulation
when it applied the regulation to invalidate the taxpayer's basis inflation
transactions. 159
Alternatively, Sala v. United States16 0 represented a setback to the Ser-
vice's use of fighting regulations to combat tax shelters. 161 In Sala, the
taxpayer engaged in a sophisticated series of international currency option
transactions that resulted in a tax loss of over $60 million on an invest-
ment of roughly $9 million.162 The United States District Court for the
154. See id. at 527 ("Based on the foregoing, the court finds that Treas. Reg.
§ 1.752-6 applies with full force here, having the effect of eliminating the increased
basis claimed by the partnership in the Canadian currency.").
155. See id. at 514-16 (chronicling series of transactions giving rise to in-
creased basis of Canadian currency assets in partnership).
156. See id. at 516 (discussing consequences of transactions on taxpayer's tax
returns).
157. See id. at 517 (discussing Service's adjustments to taxpayer's returns).
158. See id. at 524 ("Faced with similar arguments, other taxpayers have chal-
lenged the validity of the regulation itself, particularly in terms of retroactivity.
But, plaintiffs have not chosen to do so. Nonetheless, they mount a vigorous chal-
lenge to the application of the regulation to their transaction on several
grounds.").
159. See id. at 527 (applying Regulation Section 1.752-6 "with full force,"
though leaving extent of application to be determined in further proceedings).
160. 552 F. Supp. 2d 1167 (D. Colo. 2008).
161. See Sheppard, supra note 4, at 16 ("[Cemco] has so little analysis that the
Sala court felt comfortable rejecting it.").
162. See Sala, 552 F. Supp. 2d at 1175 (detailing taxpayer's transactions).
First, the taxpayer sold stock options for over $60 million. See id. (same). Second,
the taxpayer invested approximately $9 million of this money in the "Deerhurst
Program," a foreign currency investment program. See id. (same). As part of the
program, the taxpayer deposited $500,000 into a personal account at Refco Capital
Markets that Deerhurst Management Company, Inc. managed. See id. (same).
Next, the taxpayer deposited an additional $8,425,000 into his Refco account. See
id. at 1176 (same). Deerhurst Management then acquired for the taxpayer twenty-
four foreign currency options, consisting of long and short options, in several for-
eign currencies, with a net cost to the taxpayer of $728,297.85. See id. (explaining
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District of Colorado determined that the taxpayer's investment vehicle was
not a sham transaction because it held a reasonable opportunity for prof-
its. 1 6 s The court then considered the fighting regulation and found that
the regulation was overbroad, exceeded the Service's statutory authority to
regulate partner-partnership transactions, and, therefore, could not be ap-
plied retroactively.16 4
As the above discussion illustrates, litigation involving the previous
fighting regulation, Section 1.752-6, has not produced a definitive rule re-
garding retroactivity of Treasury regulations that would aid in determining
whether the courts will likely grant deference to Treasury Decision
9466.165 Treasury Decision 9466 is more controversial than the previous
Son of BOSS fighting regulations because it allows the Service to circum-
vent the Supreme Court's Colony decision. 166 Further, Treasury Decision
9466 carries with it possible procedural problems under the Administra-
foreign currency option transactions). The taxpayer then formed Solid Curren-
cies, Inc., a Delaware S corporation in which he was the sole shareholder, and
transferred the twenty-four currency options and $8 million in cash to Solid Cur-
rencies, Inc. See id. (explaining taxpayer's transactions). The taxpayer transferred
the cash and options from Solid Currencies, Inc. to Deerhurst Investors, GP, a
partnership, in exchange for partnership interests. See id. (explaining Solid Cur-
rency transactions). Deerhurst Investors, GP, was then liquidated, and Solid Cur-
rencies, Inc. received a share of the proceeds. See id. (detailing taxpayer's
transactions). For that tax year, the taxpayer reported wages of $51,748,681 but
adjusted gross income of only $23,681. See id. (explaining statements on taxpayer's
return). The taxpayer achieved a $60 million loss by exploiting the Helmer rule-
that contingent liabilities did not affect a partner's basis in the partnership-to
increase basis by the value of the long options but not offset them by the value of
the short options. See id. (explaining discrepancy between wages and adjusted
gross income). For a further discussion of the Helmer rule and its effect on partner-
ship taxation, see supra note 6.
163. See Sala, 552 F. Supp. 2d at 1186 ("In light of the potential and actual
profits arising from the Deerhurst Program, I find and conclude the program of-
fered a reasonable opportunity for profits exclusive of tax benefits and therefore
possessed economic substance.").
164. See id. at 1201 ("The overbreadth of § 1.752-6 is especially evident ....
Had congress decided to make a sea change in the law with respect to transactions
between partners and their partnerships, it would have done so directly.").
165. See, e.g., Cemco Investors v. United States, 515 F.3d 749, 751 (7th Cir.
2008) (tracing regulation's retroactivity to statute codifying economic substance
doctrine); Sala, 552 F. Supp. 2d at 1201 (finding regulation to be overbroad and
completely invalid); Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund, LLC v. United States, 440 F.
Supp. 2d 608, 625 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (concluding regulation was not retroactive
under Snap-Drape retroactivity test); Clearmeadow Invs., LLC v. United States, 87
Fed. Cl. 509, 527 (2009) (applying regulation retroactively where taxpayer did not
challenge its validity).
166. See Coder, supra note 96, at 20 ("The added wrinkle to the ongoing de-
bate over section 6501(e) is a procedural one: Will courts allow the IRS to avoid
Colony through the issuance of new regulations?"). In one case, however, the Su-
preme Court suggested that a regulation takes precedence over a prior adverse
judicial holding, so long as the judicial holding determines the statute it construes
to be ambiguous. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Assoc. v. Brand X Internet Svcs.,
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tive Procedure Act because it did not pass through the normal notice and
comment process generally required for legislative regulations.' 6 7 On the
other hand, considerations particular to the administration of revenue
laws and unique obstacles facing litigants seeking to challenge Treasury
regulations on procedural grounds make it probable that the regulations
will survive procedural challenges in court.'6 8
V. CONCLUSION
Like the earlier regulations that clarified the Service's treatment of
contingent obligations vis-1-vis basis calculations, the promulgation of
Treasury Decision 9466 will move the fight over the statute of limitations
issue from a debate over the applicability of Colony to a debate over the
167. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553 (c)-(d) (2006) (outlining notice and comment re-
quirements, and providing exception to such requirements for interpretive regula-
tions); Coder, supra note 96, at 21 (explaining that for Treasury Decision 9466 to
receive deference as legislative regulation, some exception to Administrative Pro-
cedure Act must apply). Treasury Decision 9466 did not follow the normal notice
and comment rulemaking process. See Coder, supra note 96, at 21 (noting that
little case law exists that could shed light on how courts will treat regulations' lack
of compliance with notice and comment requirements). The temporary regula-
tions explicitly state that Section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act does not
apply to the regulations because they are not a "significant regulatory action" for
the purposes of the Act. See T.D. 9466, supra note 127, at 543 ("It has been deter-
mined that these temporary regulations are not a significant regulatory action as
define in Executive Order 12866. . . . It has also been determined that [S]ection
553(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act . . . does not apply to these regula-
tions."). While the Treasury Department nearly always denies the applicability of
Section 553(b) of the Act to its regulations, under the modern distinction between
legislative and interpretive regulations, that position has become untenable. See
Kristin E. Hickman, A Problem ofRemedy: Responding to Treasury's (Lack oJ) Compliance
with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 76 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
1153, 1158-60 (2008) [hereinafter Hickman, A Problem of Remedy] (noting Trea-
sury's frequent practice of issuing binding temporary regulations open to notice
and comment only after promulgation). Further, a recent empirical study of Trea-
sury regulation projects showed that 40.9% of projects surveyed failed to meet the
requirements of Section 553 of the Act. See Kristen E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the
Lines: Examining Treasury's (Lack of) Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act
Rulemaking Requirements, 82 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1727, 1759 (2007) ("Treasury of-
fers little or no explanation for its exemption claims, however."). The modern
trend of increasing judicial application of constitutional due process standards to
administrative agencies has largely ignored the area of tax law administration. See
Leslie Book, The Collection Due Process Rights: A Misstep or a Step in the Right Direction?,
41 Hous. L. REv. 1145, 1159 (2004) ("Perhaps because taxing powers, unlike other
agency practices, are so essential to our government, administrative and constitu-
tional law scholarship has had little impact on IRS adjudication practices."). Such
considerations are, unfortunately, beyond the scope of this Note.
168. See Hickman, A Problem ofRemedy, supra note 167, at 1164-65 (noting that
26 U.S.C. § 7421, often labeled Anti-Injunction Act, and corresponding language
in DeclaratoryJudgment Act, limit timing of challenges to tax laws). But see Cohen
v. United States, 578 F.3d 1, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (remanding taxpayers' procedural
challenge to excise tax refund procedure to district court to determine if proce-
dure was "inadequate and unlawful" under Administrative Procedure Act).
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validity of the regulations.1 69 If courts strike down the regulations as inva-
lid, then Colony will resume its prior place as the controlling precedent in
overstatement of basis cases, and a multitude of Son of BOSS abusers will
likely evade potential tax liability. 170 If courts uphold the regulations, they
will effectively encourage more "bootstrapping" and "gamesmanship" by
the Government in future litigation.1 71 Perhaps the only sure lesson to be
learned from the saga of Bakersfield and Treasury Decision 9466 is that,
when one party unnecessarily pursues litigation, the result is needless un-
certainty for both parties. 172
Bernard J. Audet, Jr.
169. See Sheppard, supra note 4, at 13 ("Because the government . . . moved
the fight from where it should be to a place that has put the government in a
defensive posture . . . the government moved the legal dispute from a sensible
discussion of the concept of liability to a fight about the validity of a harsh, retroac-
tive administrative rule.").
170. For a discussion of how Colony's status as controlling precedent permits
tax abuse through Son of BOSS tax shelters, see supra notes 105-07 and accompa-
nying text.
171. See Coder, supra note 96, at 21 ("There is no bar against the IRS issuing
regulations during litigation to influence the outcome . . . . 'Claims of bootstrap-
ping is an emotional reaction; as a legal doctrine, it's not likely one taxpayers will
succeed with.'").
172. See Sheppard, supra note 4, at 9-10 ("The government should be banking
its victories and settling son-of-BOSS cases, not waiting for a conflict among the
circuits to develop on a question that has been resolved prospectively by regula-
tions defining liability for purposes of subchapter K.").
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